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Abstract: This paper explores the theoretical framework of 
judicial independence of international tribunals, with specific 
reference to the independence of the European Court of Human 
Rights. It then argues that independence is a key aspect of the 
legitimacy of an international tribunal and suggests that legal 
reforms designed to enhance the judicial independence of the 
European Court of Human Rights should focus on the two main 
structural parts of the Court, namely the judiciary and the Registry. 
This paper analyses a number of proposed reforms that can make 
the European Court of Human Rights more independent and 
credible. These insights are applicable to other international judicial 
fora.
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I. Introduction
An international human rights tribunal which lacks 
independence cannot be legitimate. An international tribunal 
without legitimacy cannot be effective. International justice lacks a 
mechanism for the coercive execution of judgments.  Neither sheriff 
nor enforcement officer exists to impose the will of an international 
court on sovereign states, execution is almost always voluntary.4
4. The Contracting Parties experience political pressure from the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe.  However the effect of this pressure varies 
depending on the size and importance of the Contracting Party concerned, and 
other relevant considerations such as cost of execution.  See Paul Mahoney, The 
International Judiciary - Independence and Accountability, 7 LAW & PRAC. INTL CTS &
TRIBUNALS 313, 317 (2008); see also DANIEL TERRIS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE. AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN  WHO DECIDE THE WORLDS CASES 149 (2007). 
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The Member States must first accept an international court as a 
legitimate decision maker and only then can effective execution be 
secured.
This paper analyses the notion of independence in international 
law.  While the need for ensuring independence of justice is an 
axiom in domestic legal systems, some commentators have argued 
this is not the case in international law. This paper considers the 
latter argument and concludes this approach is questionable in 
relation to international law tribunals and totally unacceptable in 
the case of human rights tribunals dealing with individual 
complaints.  This article argues independence is a requirement of 
the rule of law for international adjudicators.  Unbiased rulings 
enhance the trust of stakeholders in an international tribunal.  
Independence is especially important if the court can adjudicate 
claims against state institutions because the state retains more 
influence over courts than private parties by default.5
The primary focus of this paper is the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), which was created more than 50 years ago 
and is currently the most successful international human rights 
tribunal in the world.  The ECtHR supervises compliance of the 
Contracting Parties with the European Convention on Human 
Rights which establishes a basic list of fundamental rights and 
freedoms. The ECtHR has jurisdiction over 47 Contracting Parties.6
47 judges elected in respect of every Contracting Parties can review 
individual complaints brought against the Contracting Parties.  This 
paper argues the effectiveness of the Strasbourg system depends on 
its legitimacy which, in the eyes of stakeholders, is inextricably 
linked to the real and perceived independence of the Court.7
5. As Christopher Larkins argues, judicial independence takes on critical 
significance when the government is one of the parties to a dispute, as the case then 
involves general issues of the rule of law. If the enforcement of this principle is to be 
entrusted to the courts, then it is absolutely essential that judges not be biased in favor 
of the government. Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: 
A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 608 (1996).
6. Belarus is the last major European state that has not yet ratified the ECHR.  
See COUNCIL EUR., RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN PRACTICE (2014), http://www.echr
.coe.int/Documents/Pub_coe_Teaching_resources_ENG.pdf.
7. The legitimacy of the ECtHR is the subject that attracted substantial 
academic attention in recent years.  See, e.g., Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Alan 
Greene, Legitimacy and the Future of the European Court of Human Rights: Critical 
Perspectives from Academia and Practitioners, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1707 (2011); BASAK ÇAL õ
ET AL., THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE VIEW FROM 
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The second section of this paper sets the theoretical framework 
for inquiry into the independence of the international judiciary.  It 
shows the link between independence, the rule of law and the 
legitimacy of international tribunals.  It observes independence is 
important for international tribunals adjudicating disputes between 
sovereign states, but it is even more important in the case of 
international human rights tribunals dealing with individual 
applications, such as the ECtHR.  This section then argues that the 
independence of the ECtHR depends on two intrinsically linked but 
logically separable considerations.  First, the independence of the 
ECtHR judges should be secured.  Second, the Courts Registry 
should be independent.
The third section focuses on the independence of the ECtHR 
judges who are the key decision-makers at the Court and 
collectively determine the outcomes of the human rights disputes. 
Interference by the national authorities is mostly possible at the 
national nomination stage of the election process. Increased 
transparency and stakeholder-involvement should be promoted at 
this stage.  Moreover, it is observed here that if the principle of 
national representation is removed from the Convention, than the 
politically sensitive aspect of the election process will wane.  The 
principle of national representation means that the judge elected in 
respect of a Contracting Party will have to be on the bench when a 
case against this Contracting Party is adjudicated by the Court.  This 
principle applies to Chambers of 7 judges and Grand Chambers of 
17 judges which deal with the most important cases. This paper 
advocates for the removal of the principle of national representation 
from the ECHR.  Among other important aspects of judicial 
independence this paper analyses judicial tenure, social security and 
immunities of judges.
The fourth section explores an important but largely ignored 
component of the independence of an international tribunal, the 
THE GROUND (2011); Andreas Follesdal, The Legitimacy of International Human Rights 
Review: The Case of the European Court of Human Rightsi, 40 J. SOC. PHIL. 595 (2009); 
George Letsas, The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitimacy, in
CONSTITUTING EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NATIONAL,
EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL CONTEXT 106 (Andreas Follesdal et al. eds., 2013); Tom Zwart, 
More Human Rights than Court: Why the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human 
Rights is in Need of Repair and How It Can Be Done, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND ITS DISCONTENTS (Spyridon Flogaitis et al. eds. 2013); Kanstantsin 
Dzehtsiarou, Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law 
of the European Court of Human Rights, PUB. L. 534 (2011).
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independence of its personnel.  In the case of the ECtHR this is 
called the Registry.  This paper argues that independence should not 
only be secured from external actors but also from the political 
branches of the Council of Europethe parent organisation of the 
ECtHR.  Key areas for securing the independence of the Registry 
mostly repose in the areas of human resource management and the 
financial autonomy of the Court.  This paper discusses the 
recruitment policy of the Court and the Council of Europe, the use 
of seconded lawyers in the Registry and considers the budgetary 
independence of the Court.
II. The Theoretical Importance of Judicial Independence in 
International Law
Judicial independence in international law is in purgatory.  This 
may be somewhat surprising given the judicial independence of 
domestic courts is recognised as a cornerstone of modern legal 
systems and is relatively uncontroversial.8 Posner and Yoo argue 
international tribunals are more effective if staffed by judges who 
can be influenced by the State-parties.  Only then will the judges be 
forced to find a solution that will best serve the interest of both 
parties.9
Helfer and Slaughter are unconvinced by this argument; they 
observe that [i]ndependent tribunals act as trustees to enhance the 
credibility of international commitments in specific multilateral
contexts.10 Moreover, they argue that independent tribunals are 
more detached from the momentary interests of the parties and 
tribunals and they are likely to advance states long-term interests.11
While the argument elaborated by Posner and Yoo may have 
8. See, e.g., E.S.C. Res. 2006/23, U.N. Doc/ E/RES/2006/23 (July 27, 2006); 
Piersack v. Belgium, No. 8692/79, 5 E.H.R.R. 169, 179 (1983). See also Shimon 
Shetreet, Standards of Conduct of International Judges: Outside Activities, 2 L. & PRAC.
INTL CTS. & TRIBUNALS 127, 128 (2003); Dinah Shelton, Legal Norms to Promote the 
Independence and Accountability of International Tribunal, 2 L. & PRAC. INTL CTS. &
TRIBUNALS 27, 27 (2003); TERRIS, supra note 4, at 147; Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of 
International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 102 AM. POL.
SC. R. 417, 417 (2008); John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: 
Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S. CALIF. L. REV. 353, 354 (1998-1999).
9. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 
93 CALIF. L.REV. 1, 27 (2005).
10. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International 
Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 899, 904 (2005).
11. Id. at 6-7.
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some foundation in classical international law tribunals which deal 
with cases between state parties, this argument is inapplicable to 
human rights tribunals which can accept individual complaints 
against State Parties.12 In fact, the overwhelming majority of 
commentators argue that international tribunals should indeed be 
independent to fulfil their mission effectively.13
The multivalent nature of an international tribunal that 
interacts with both States and individuals means that such tribunals 
operate from a position of overlapping legitimacies; they must 
appear legitimate to all applicants, not merely to State actors.14 A 
court that seeks to protect state parties interests alone crucially 
undermines its legitimacy with individual applicants, and it cannot
maintain diffuse support from the public.15 The ECtHR is 
increasingly conceptualised as a constitutionalist court16 which 
12. Posner and Yoo have discussed the ECtHR in their study but did not arrive 
at a firm conclusion as to whether the ECtHR also fits into their model.  See Posner 
& Yoo, supra note 9, at 63-67.
13. Judge Julia Laffranque of the ECtHR notes, judges draw their legitimacy 
from the law, which requires them to be independent and impartial. Julia 
Laffranque, Judicial Independence – as Natural as the Air We Breath, in DOMMERNES 
UAVHENGIGHEIT 327, 327-328 (Nils Asbjorn Engstad et al. eds. 2012).  Eyal Benvinisti 
and George Downs argue that legitimacy of international tribunals is critically tied 
to the extent to which they are viewed as independent.  See Eyal Benvenisti & 
George W. Downs, Prospects for the Increased Independence of International Tribunals, 
12 GERMAN L.J. 1057, 1057 (2011).
14. Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke argue that there is a new 
cosmopolitan approach to operations of international tribunals: [i]t takes the 
individual citizen to be the ultimate reference point in the justification of public 
authority and invests it with a national as well as a cosmopolitan identity.  Armin 
von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? An Investigation of International 
Courts’ Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification,  23 EUR. J. INTL L. 7, 34 (2012).
15. Shai Dothan states, diffuse support . . . measures whether the public is 
generally inclined to accept a court's judgments, even if they disagree with a 
specific judgment.  Shai Dothan, How International Courts Enhance Their Legitimacy, 
14 THEO. INQ. L. 455, 456 (2013); see also, James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & 
Lester Kenyatta Spence, Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing 
Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POL. RES. Q. 187, 188 (2005) 
(discussing diffuse support).
16. There is a tendency in academic literature to accept that the ECtHR is a 
constitutionalist court.  See, e.g., Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet, in ON LAW,
POLITICS, & JUDICIALIZATION 155 (2002); see also Fiona de Londras, Dual Functionality 
and the Persistent Frailty of the European Court of Human Rights Eur. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
38 (2013); Steven Greer and Luzius Wildhaber, Revisiting the Debate about 
'Constitutionalising' the European Court of Human Rights 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 655 
(2012); Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Alan Greene, Restructuring the European Court of 
Human Rights: Preserving the right of Individual Petition and Promoting 
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should not only find a solution capable of satisfying the interests of 
the State parties, but must also look for a solution which will 
enhance human rights protection in Europe.17 This means the 
ECtHR must be independent in order to secure  legitimacy.18
Paul Mahoney also argued that the Contracting Parties benefit 
from independent human rights courts:
[T]he truly independent international judicial control of national 
action in the field of human rights is not only of occasional benefit 
for the few individuals who once in a while win a case but also 
one means (among many others, of course) of strengthening and 
developing a healthy, dynamic democratic society.19
An independent international tribunal not only strengthens the 
legitimacy of the tribunal itself, but also strengthens the national 
legal system.20
Furthermore, independence is an inherent aspect of the rule of 
law.  Academic discussions of the rule of law typically separate it 
into two conceptions: a thick conception, which incorporates 
substantive elements, and a thin conception, which focuses on more 
formal elements.  The importance of an independent judiciary is 
conceded by both schools of thought.  In the formal school, Joseph 
Raz argues:
The rules concerning the independence of the judiciarythe
method of appointing judges, their security of tenure, the way of 
fixing their salaries, and other conditions of serviceare designed
to guarantee that they will be free from extraneous pressures and 
Constitutionalism, PUB. L. 711 (2013).
17. In 2003, international human rights NGO Interights published a report 
about independence of the ECtHR. Interights experts stated that the Courts 
independence is important because, the Courts law and practice has increasing 
influence on the law and practice of the Member States, assuming a quasi-
constitutional nature that underlines the importance of the standards maintained 
by the Court itself.  JUTTA LIMBACH ET AL., JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (2003) 
(discussing the Interights report).
18. Lord Hoffmann, for instance, emphasized the drawbacks in elections to the 
ECtHR. This led him to conclude that, to the people of the United Kingdom, this 
judicial body [the ECtHR] does not enjoy the constitutional legitimacy.  Leonard 
Hoffmann, The Universality of Human Rights, 125 LAW Q. REV. 416, 429 (2009).
19. Paul Mahoney, Parting Thoughts of an Outgoing Registrar of the European 
Court of Human Rights, 26 HUM. RTS. L.J. 345, 345 (2005).
20. This is particularly the case in young democracies. See Andrew Moravcsik, 
The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 
INTL ORG. 217 (2000).
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independent of all authority save that of the law.  They are, 
therefore, essential for the preservation of the rule of law.21
Similarly, proponents of the thick conception such as Tom Bingham 
recognise the importance of an independent judiciary for the rule of 
law.22 The rule of law is mentioned as part of the common 
heritage of the signatories of the European Convention of Human 
Rights in the Preamble.  It therefore forms part of the value
framework of Convention jurisprudence. 
Judicial independence is required by the rule of law23 and is 
indissociable from the very concept of justice.24 Consequentially, 
more than a dozen international conventions, regulations and 
protocols codify the standards of independence of domestic courts.25
One must now consider which standards should be applicable to 
international judges: should existing national standards be adopted 
or should new standards be created? 
This paper argues that the elaboration of the standards of 
judicial independence in the ECtHR has often occurred without 
consideration of the insights which national court independence can 
21. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 217 (1979).
22. Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law, 66 CALIF. L. REV 67, 80 (2007).
23. Mahoney, supra note 4, at 317.
24. Id. at 316.
25. See, e.g., SHIMON SHETREET & JULES DESCHENES, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 139  42, 481, 489, 490,  (Shimon Shetreet & Jules Deschenes 
eds., 1985) (discussing in detail, Syracuse Draft Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary Adopted at Syracuse, Sicily (1981), the Universal Declaration on the 
Independence of Justice Adopted at Montreal, Canada (1983)).  See also United Nations 
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary G.A. Res. 40/146, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985); COUNCIL EUR., EUROPEAN CHARTER ON THE STATUTE 
FOR JUDGES AND EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM (1998)
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round4/European-
Charter-on-Statute-of-Judges_EN.pdf;
COMMENTARY ON THE BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007), 
http://www.unrol.org/files/publications_cnodc_ commentary-E[1].pdf. A 
number of documents were adopted by the Consultative Council of European 
Judges (CCJE). See, e.g., CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL EUR. JUDGES, MAGNA CARTA OF 
JUDGES (2010) https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1707925; CONSULTATIVE 
COUNCIL EUR. JUDGES, FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS OF THE 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ON STANDARDS CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE 
JUDICIARY AND THE IRREMOVABILITY OF JUDGES, OPINION NO. 1, (2001) [hereinafter 
Irremovability of Judges], 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CCJE(2001)OP1&Sector=secDGHL&
Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=FEF2E0&BackColorIntran
et=FEF2E0&BackColorLogged=c3c3c3.
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provide.  The development of standards designed to protect 
independence, while recognising the special supranational nature of 
the ECtHR means direct transposition of national standards is not 
always appropriate,26 should take due account of those national 
protections.  We offer a number of proposed reforms based on a 
synthesis of national and supranational considerations. 
A. Unique Features of Supranational Systems
There are a number of features of a supranational legal system 
which mean the direct transposition of national standards is not 
always suitable.  One such feature is how the judgments of the 
ECtHR are enforced.  Since the ECtHR cannot coercively implement 
its decisions, the Contracting Parties must still accept the legitimacy 
of the Courts judgments even when the Court rules against them.  It 
is technically correct that national courts often cannot stricto sensu
enforce their judgments and have to rely on the executive branch of 
Government to do so.27 Nonetheless, national courts usually have 
more clear remedies entrenched in their national constitutional 
architecture.  Therefore, the judgments of domestic courts are nearly 
always automatically executed.  In the case of international 
tribunals, the execution of judgments is more complex, and the 
Contracting Parties generally have to accept and execute them.  
Therefore, Terris, Romano and Swigart argue the work of 
international courts can never be entirely divorced from the world 
of international politics.28 The ECtHR deals with sovereign states 
and the capacity of international courts to flourish depends on the 
support of the States.29 This tension must be borne in mind when 
considering the development of standards designed to protect the 
independence of international judges. 
Another difference between national and international judges is 
26. Mahoney has pointed out that, [a]s a matter of principle, standards of 
judicial independence [of international courts are] analogous, though not 
necessarily identical, to those applicable to national judges apply to international 
judges.  Mahoney, supra note 4, at 315 and 346.  Laffranque also claims that the 
principles and standards created for the judiciary of the Member States should not 
be forgotten in relation to independence of the ECtHR.  Laffranque, supra note 13, at 
338.  See also, Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 13, at 1058.
27. There are, of course, famous instances where the executive branches of 
national governments have simply refused to execute a decision. See, e.g., Ex Parte 
Merryman (1861) 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
28. TERRIS, supra note 4, at xxi.
29. Mahoney, supra note 4, at 318.
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that the independence of the latter should be guarded from the 
interventions of multiple States.30 Such pressure from multiple 
States can be more effective than an intervention by a single State.  
In the (in)famous case of Lautsi and others v Italy the Court had to 
decide if the mandatory display of crucifixes in Italian public 
schools violated Article 9 of the ECHR (freedom of religion).31 The 
Governments of 10 Contracting Parties32 intervened at the Grand 
Chamber stage with third party submissions.  In this case the Grand 
Chamber reversed the chamber decision and found no violation. 
The relative infrequency of such interventions means that this 
threat to the independence of the ECtHR has not appeared 
particularly pressing.  This may change with the accession of the EU 
to the ECtHR.  First, the ECtHR will have to take into account what 
the EU has decided because it will represent 29 Contracting Parties to 
the Convention.33 This is likely to be accorded particular importance 
in relation to the ascertainment of European consensus.34 Second, the 
accession may provide greater possibilities of collective action 
approaches by national States.  An agreed strategy by European-wide 
groupings such as the European Peoples Party or the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats could result in concerted 
submissions by the national State Governments, which belong to 
those groupings. 
B. The Standard of Judicial Independence
One further difficulty in any attempt to consider the application 
of judicial independence to the ECtHR is that there is no consensus 
on the definition of judicial independence.35 We proceed on the 
basis of the Commentary on the Bangalore principle of judicial 
30. Shetreet, supra note 8, at 129 and 148.
31. Lautsi and others v. Italy, 54 Eur.. Ct. H.R. 3 (2011).
32. Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Russian Federation, Greece, Lithuania, 
Malta, Monaco, Romania and the Republic of San Marino.
33. 28 Member States of the EU and the EU itself. 
34. See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and Pavel Repyeuski, European Consensus and 
the EU Accession to the ECHR, in THE EU ACCESSION TO THE ECHR (Vasiliki Kosta et 
al. eds. 2014).
35. While most of the definitions contain similar aspects, there is no single 
universally accepted definition.  As such, Larkins argued that judicial 
independence is one of the least understood concepts of political science and law.  
Larkins, supra note 5, at 607.
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conduct,36 which explains:
Judicial independence refers to both the individual and the 
institutional independence required for decision-making. Judicial 
independence is, therefore, both a state of mind and a set of 
institutional and operational arrangements. The former is 
concerned with the judges independence in fact; the latter with 
defining the relationships between the judiciary and others, 
particularly the other branches of government, so as to assure 
both the reality and the appearance of independence. The 
relationship between these two aspects of judicial independence is 
that an individual judge may possess that state of mind, but if the 
court over which he or she presides is not independent of the 
other branches of government in what is essential to its functions, 
the judge cannot be said to be independent.37
On various occasions the ECtHR assessed the independence of 
domestic tribunals and elaborated a set of criteria for independence.  
In Langborger v Sweden the ECtHR stated that in order to establish 
whether a body can be considered independent, regard must be 
had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and 
their term of office, to the existence of guarantees against outside 
pressures and to the question whether the body presents an 
appearance of independence.38 The Court has elaborated the basic 
principles of judicial independence but as Paul Mahoney observes 
international tribunals are reluctant to affirm the applicability of 
these principles to an assessment of their own independence.39
Nonetheless the Langborger criteria provide a useful metric to assess 
whether the judiciary of the ECtHR is independent.
36. The United Nations Social and Economic Council, by resolution 2006/23, 
has invited member States consistent with their domestic legal systems to 
encourage their judiciaries to take into consideration the Bangalore Principles of 
Judicial Conduct when reviewing or developing rules with respect to the 
professional and ethical conduct of the members of the judiciary.  U.N. Economic 
and Social Council Res. 2006/23: Strengthening Basic Principles of Judicial 
Conduct, E/RES/2006/23 (July, 23 2006), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/46c455ab0.html.
37. Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, JUDICIAL INTEGRITY 
GROUP, http://www.judicialintegritygroup.org/index.php/jig-resources/jig-
documents (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).  
38. Langborger v. Sweden, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. 416 at ¶32 (1990); see also Ben 
Olbourne, Independence and Impartiality: International Standards for national Judges and 
Courts, 2 L. & PRAC. INTL CTS. & TRIBUNALS 97, 109--113 (2003) (discussion of the 
standards for judicial independence elaborated by the ECtHR).
39. Mahoney, supra note 4, at 317.
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C. Independence of the ECtHR
Many external commentators agree that the ECtHR presents an 
appearance of independence.40 Dzehtsiarou has canvassed the 
opinion of 50 lawyers and NGO activists from Russia, Moldova, 
Azerbaijan, and Ukraine about judicial independence. The 
participants were first asked whether they consider their domestic 
courts to be independent.  Only about 5% of participants answered 
yes to this question.41 The participants were then asked if they 
consider the ECtHR more independent than their domestic courts, 
and all participants answered they believed the ECtHR is more 
independent.  These results were confirmed by semi-structured 
interviews with the lawyers from Moldova which revealed that trust 
in domestic judicial institutions is very low.  The vast majority of 
Moldovan lawyers, however, perceive the ECtHR as an independent 
court.  Moldovan lawyers were asked the open question why do you 
consider the ECtHR more independent? and the following answers 
were most prevalent: 
1) remoteness from the parties, 
2) judges are from different countries and the bias of one 
judge can be mitigated by other judges, 
3) there are usually better safeguards of independence 
than for local judges, 
4) there is a clear procedure and good convincing 
reasoning of the judgments.
Some participants have observed that the ECtHR is indeed 
more independent than national Courts but that it is not absolutely 
independent.  One of the lawyers of the ECtHR explained that 
[I]ndependence of the Court is secured by the modus operandi of 
the Court meaning that there are too many people (judges and 
lawyers) involved in the Courts adjudication and if one person is 
biased it is normally rectified by the others. Moreover, the fact 
that the Court is geographically remote from the parties to the 
case also helps. State interference is normally not justified because 
the major part of the Courts docket consists of repetitive cases of 
low importance. It is also unwise for the private parties to try to 
influence the Court because the Court proceedings are long and 
40. See Voeten, supra note 8; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 10, at 21; Posner & 
Yoo, supra note 9, at 63.
41. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou Interviews with lawyers from Russia, Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan, and Moldova.
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the just compensation is usually relatively small.42
Furthermore, academics such as Voeten argue that national 
governments themselves may have reasons to appoint activist 
judges who can bolster judicial independence.43 First, national 
governments that favour European integration tend to appoint more 
independent judges.44 Second, countries which seek to become 
members of the EU may try to signal their adherence to 
international human rights standards by appointing independent 
judges.45
Given the positive response by interviewees to these questions 
and the fact that national governments often favour judicial 
independence, Europeans must consider whether there is any need 
to alter the current system of judicial independence in the ECtHR.  
First, perceived independence is obviously a relative concept, and it 
seems likely that lawyers in countries with more robust domestic 
human rights protections will have different responses to the ECtHR 
compared to those in more newly fledged democracies.  Second, 
some commentators have expressed concerns about different areas 
relating to judicial independence in the ECtHR including, for 
instance, the election of judges.46 Third, there have been a few cases 
reported when a judge of the Court were publicly and personally 
criticised for their decisions,47 or as in case with Judge Wildhaber48
42. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou Interview with a lawyer of the ECtHR Registry.
43. Voeten, supra note 8. 
 44. Id. at 697.
45. Id. at 678  679, 697.
46. LIMBACH, supra note 17, at 18 (calling the national nomination of candidates, 
unclear, apparently politicised and unaccountable.).
47. Voeten lists a few instances of such influence.  Voeten, supra note 8, 419-422.  
(Voeten describes how, for example, the British tabloid The Sun calling the judges of 
the ECtHR Euro clowns, or the Albanian opposition party expressed 
embarrassment for the vote of the Albanian judge in the case of Abu-Hamsa.)
48. Luke Harding, I Was Poisoned by Russians, Human Rights Judge Says, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2007) available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/fe
b/01/russia.topstories3.  In the interview published by the European Human 
Rights Law Review, Judge Wildhaber asked rhetorically, Is there any reason to 
suspect that someone tried to poison me?  Look, I had repeated clashes and 
disagreements with the Russians and I think this was inevitable.  If you have 
people who come into your office in Strasbourg and tell you that you should order 
the judges about how to vote in a given case, or the Head of State sends you a 
message about what should happen in another case, you are bound to have 
disagreements. But is that enough to want to kill someone? I should say no.  So my 
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has even been allegedly poisoned in Russia. If the court delivers 
unpopular judgments, the Court as an institution, or even the 
individual judges can become targets of very unfair critiques.49
Fourth, Benvenisti and Downs argue that the more influential a 
court becomes the more its independence will be threatened.50 Since 
the Courts importance and weight continues to grow,51 attempts to 
intervene in the Courts functioning will increase.  Moreover, the 
early threats to the Courts independence, such as the threat to 
denounce the Convention, are likely be superseded by more subtle 
methods of interference (except in the case of Judge Wildhaber, 
where the interference was more direct).52 Fifth, the fact that there 
are too many people for one national government to systematically 
influence the decisions of the ECtHR in its favour does not mean it 
is not possible for national governments to influence split decisions, 
because a national judge is always appointed to hear a case.53
Finally, the changing institutional nature of the Court in light of the 
changes in the tenure of the judges of the Court and increase in 
personnel of the registry, and the accession of new, influential, 
signatories to the Convention means that new vistas of interference 
have opened up which the current institutional framework may be 
conclusion is this: I had septicaemia.  We do not know how it originated.  That does 
not mean I was poisoned.  Steven Greer, Reflections of a former President of the 
European Court of Human Rights, EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 165, 169-170 (2010).   
Examples of such direct influence are rare.  I have never experienced nor heard 
any other judge talk of any pressure or effort from either his government or one of 
the parties or anything of that kind, says a veteran of one of the European Courts.  
As far as my own government is concerned says another European judge, I am 
in a most felicitous situation of being able to say I have never had a phone call from 
my government nor did I have any phone calls from the attorneys of the applicants.  
Thats really very comfortable.  TERRIS, supra note 4, at 150.  Recently retired 
Russian judge Judge Kovler also stated that he has never been subjected to 
administrative pressure from Russia.  Anatoly Kovler, When One Disagrees One 
Should Remain Professional: Interview with Judge Anatoly Kovler, 5 INTL JUST. J. (in 
Russian) 66, 68 (2013).  Judges of the ECtHR interviewed by the author have also 
expressed similar views.
49. Ferejohn, supra note 8, at 374.
50. Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 13, at 1060.
51. Shapiro and Stone Sweet conclude that the ECtHR has rendered enough 
judgments that have caused enough changes in state practices so that it can be 
counted to a rather high degree as a constitutional review court.  Shapiro & Stone 
Sweet, supra note 16, at 155.
52. ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
311 (2010). Anne-Marie Slaughter & Laurence Helfer, Towards a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J., 273, 367 (1997).
53. See Voeten, supra note 8, at 426.
Dzehtsiarou Coffey FINAL MACRO 4/14/14 9:57 PM
2014] Legitimacy and Independence of International Tribunals 283
inadequate to protect against.
This paper will discuss the organisational and architectural 
safeguards of judicial independence.  Judicial independence cannot 
be guaranteed only by measures like security of tenure or a proper 
social security system for judges and judicial assistants.54 These 
conditions are necessary but not sufficient to establish true judicial 
independence. 
Some commentators argue that the Courts independence 
waxes and wanes, and it depends on political competition [which] 
plays a key role in determining judicial independence [. . .].55 It has 
been argued the independence and effectiveness of the Court can be 
enhanced by the judicial strategies it deploys in its judgments.56
This paper will not analyse this aspect of judicial independence 
since in order to discuss these more advanced elements of judicial 
independence one should first put in place some basic legal 
safeguards. 
Legal safeguards of the independence of the ECtHR should be 
divided into two categories, depending on whether they guarantee 
the independence of judges or the independence of the ECtHR 
beyond merely judicial independence.  The independence of the 
judiciary is at the forefront of every discussion of the independence 
of the Court.  The Council of Europe has made significant progress 
in securing the independence of judges. It does not mean that 
nothing more can be done in this area57 but it is already densely 
populated by legal norms and regulations.
The second category of measures secures the independence of 
the Court beyond the membership of the bench itself.  As the 
Working Paper on the Conclusions of the Committee on the 
Judiciary and the Legal Profession under the Rule of Law noted: It 
is . . . important to have regard to the independence not only of the 
judge but also of the Judiciary as an institution; the latter may 
54. McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
105, 106 (2006).
55. Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 13, at 1071.
56. Independent international tribunals have been able to further increase 
interstate competition by weighing in on behalf of weaker state interests rather than 
operating as the agents of powerful states as they would have been forced to do 
under conditions of dependency. Id. at 1078.  See Shai Dothan, Judicial Tactics in the 
European Court of Human Rights, 12 CHI. J. INTL. L. 115 (2011) (discussing various 
strategies available to the ECtHR).
57. Mahoney, supra note 4, at 327.
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provide traditions and a sense of corporate responsibility which are 
a stronger guarantee of independence than the private conscience of 
the individual judge.58 In the context of the ECtHR, it is impossible 
to consider the corporate responsibility of the Court without due 
consideration of the role of the Registry.  It maintains the institutional 
memory of the Court.  The judges of the Court are on the bench for 
only 9 years.59 Some lawyers in the Registry have permanent 
contracts and stay in the Court for much longer terms.  For instance, 
Erik Fribergh the current Registrar of the Court has been working 
first in the Commission and then the Court since 1981.60 The 
institutional importance of the Registry has been recognised by the 
Judiciary of the ECtHR; one judge interviewed noted the way the 
system is now with the registry which is permanent, the registry is 
extremely strong, extremely powerful.61 Moreover, the role of the 
Registry is much more important than the provision of simple 
administrative support.  The Registry plays a larger role in ensuring 
the legitimacy of the structure of the ECHR.  Tyler has demonstrated 
the most important element that affects individuals in legal disputes 
is the process by which their case is handled.62 The most important 
considerations in determining whether a legal procedure is viewed as 
fair or not include: participation, trustworthiness, interpersonal 
respect, and neutrality.63 Any elements of the composition of the 
Registry or the ECtHR which undermine these elements pose a 
potential problem for the perceived legitimacy of the ECtHR as a 
whole.
This category also includes the institutional autonomy of the 
Court from the Council of Europe.  The Council is a political 
organisation comprised of the Member States representatives. One 
should not forget that the States are the parties in the cases heard by the 
58. INTL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, The Rule of Law in a Free Society: A Report on the 
International Congress of Jurists, New Delhi, India (1959).
59. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 23, Sept. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 
222.
60. Judges of the Court, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/E
N/Header/The+Court/The+Court/Judges+of+the+Court/ (last visited Jan. 24, 
2014).
61. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou Interviews with the Judges of the ECtHR.
62. Tom Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science 
Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform,  45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 882 (1997).
63. Id. at 887-892.  These considerations hold through in heterogeneous 
societies.  See generally Tom Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to 
Defer to Law and to Legal Authorities, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 983 (2000).
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ECtHR. It is surprising that the issue of administrative autonomy of the 
Court has not been much discussed in academic literature until 
recently.64
III. The Independence of the Judges of the ECtHR
One major threat to the independence of the judiciary of the 
ECtHR is national representation, the process by which a judge 
elected from a Member State is automatically appointed in any case 
to which the Members State is the respondent.  This process can give 
the Member States a false impression judges should act to represent 
the interests of the country to which they are a national.  Although 
Posner and Yoo believe this is one of the sole grounds on which the 
legitimacy of international human rights tribunals rests, we argue 
such a cramped conception of legitimacy should be rejected.  In fact, 
the legitimacy of the ECtHR is undermined if it rests solely on 
Posner and Yoos conception of legitimacy.65
The ability of Member States to promote their interests in the 
Court is most powerful during the election process.  States gain an 
advantage through the monopolisation of relevant information by 
Member State Governments, preventing informed decision-making, 
nominating partisan candidates, and other processes such as 
lobbying.  This article advocates an approach based on the 
principles of transparency and informed assent by the members of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).  Such 
a system can further legitimise the ECtHR.  This paper identifies 
how national representation distorts the election process and 
advocates the abolition of the national representation procedure.  
However, national representation might not be abandoned for 
political or policy reasons.  If it cannot be eliminated, other checks 
should be introduced in order to safeguard the independence of the 
judiciary.
A. Election of the Judges
The manner in which a judge is appointed or elected presents 
64. Laffranque argues that, [i]t might be very surprising at first glance that, 
e.g., talks about administrative autonomy of the European Court of Human Rights 
from the Council of Europe are only recently, and in a very cumbersome way, 
beginning to take concrete shape.  Laffranque, supra note 13, at 337.
65. See also Dzehtsiarou, supra note 7.
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one of the key areas in which political manipulation can occur.66
The election of the judges is one of the cornerstones of the judicial 
independence of any court, including the ECtHR. These elections 
have evolved from simply rubber-stamping the choice of the 
Member States by the PACE to more insightful consideration and 
meritorious assessment of the candidates.  Despite this 
development, the selection of judges by the PACE has recently been 
called a Byzantine appointments procedure.67 The procedure of 
the election of the judges should be further improved.
The election of the judges of the ECtHR is a three stage process.  
A Member State first nominates three candidates for the position of 
judge.  The second stage is an interview with the candidates 
conducted by the special Sub-Committee of the PACE.  The Sub-
Committee can suggest to the PACE to return the list to the Member 
State, if the list, for instance, contains only one real candidate or if it 
is not gender balanced.  The authority of the PACE to do so was 
confirmed by the ECtHR in an advisory opinion.68 If there are no 
reasons for rejection, the Sub-Committee passes the list to the PACE 
and encloses a confidential report with its evaluation of the 
candidates.  The final stage of the appointment procedure is to hold 
an election where the PACE can vote twice: the judge is elected 
during the first round if one of the candidates receives an absolute 
majority of votes.  If nobody receives an absolute majority, a simple 
majority is sufficient in the second round.69
66. Limbach argues that the appointment procedures impact directly upon the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary. Since the legitimacy and credibility 
of any judicial institution depends upon public confidence in its independence, it is 
imperative that appointment procedures for judicial office conform to - and are 
seen to conform to -international standards on judicial independence.  LIMBACH, 
supra note 17, at 6.  According to Burbank, the political branches control of the 
judicial appointments process poses . . . a threat to judicial independence.  Pamela 
S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 545 (1998-
1999).
67. Owen Bowcott, Paul Mahoney Appointed UK's New Judge in Strasbourg, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 27, 2012, 18:37 EDT), http://www.thegu
ardian.com/law/2012/jun/27 /paul-mahoney-european-court-judge.
68. Advisory Opinion on Certain Legal Questions Concerning the Lists of 
Candidates Submitted with a View to the Election of Judges to the European Court
of Human Rights, (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
69. EUR. PARL. ASS., RESOLUTION 1726 ON THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTERLAKEN PROCESS, para. 8 (2010); 
see also EUR. PAR. ASS., COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROCEDURE 
FOR ELECTING JUDGES TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS INFORMATION 
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1. Nomination
The first stage of the election procedurenomination of the 
candidatesis crucial, and the quality of nomination at the national 
level will determine the quality of the judge ultimately elected by 
the PACE.70 This stage is troublesome for primarily two reasons.  
Despite the importance of this stage, it is often seen as the most 
troublesome element of the election procedure for two main 
reasons.  First, the Convention does not provide detailed criteria for 
office.  Although the Council of Europe has since provided some 
guidance on this issue, this has been criticized and has been the 
subject of political controversy.71 Second, some procedures at 
national level might be politically motivated.  The fact the 
candidates are nominated by political institutions makes some 
political influence inevitable, but more importantly, there is a lack of 
transparency in how the selections are made.  The stakes are 
elevated for the Member States, because they know any appointee 
will sit on cases that affect it. The influence of Member States on 
sitting judges is likely to be largely illusory due to the strong 
collegial independence which the European Court enjoys, but is 
DOCUMENT PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT (2014) [hereinafter Committee on Legal 
Affairs Report], http://asse mbly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2014/
ajinfdoc03_2014.pdf (The candidate having obtained an absolute majority of votes 
cast is declared elected a member of the Court.  If no candidate obtains an absolute 
majority, a second ballot is held, after which the candidate who has obtained a 
relative majority of votes cast is declared elected.  Election results are publicly 
announced by the President of the Assembly during the part-session.) (citing 
Resolution 1726).
70. It is worth mentioning that two factors may have contribution to defects in 
the election process: (1) a lack of precise criteria about training in the area of human 
rights, and (2) deficient language competence contributed to some defects in 
election process.  See Loukis G. Loucaides, Reflections of a Former European Court of 
Human Rights Judge on His Experiences as a Judge, 1 ROMA RIGHTS (2010), available at
http://www.errc.org/roma-rights-journal/roma-rights-1-2010-implemen tation-of-
judgments/3613/8.
71. The Council of Europe requires that the list submitted is gender balanced.  
See EUR. PARL. ASS., RESOLUTION 1366 ON CANDIDATES FOR THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2010), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/RoP/RoP-XML2HTML-
EN.asp?id=EN_CEGCAIFG#Format-It ([T]he political groups, when nominating 
their representatives to the sub-committee, should aim to include at least 40% 
women, which is the parity threshold deemed necessary by the Council of Europe 
to exclude possible gender bias in decision-making processes.).  The list from 
Malta was therefore rejected due to the fact that it contained only male candidates 
for the position of a judge.  The Maltese authorities expressed their concerns by this 
rejection and the ECtHR had to deliver an advisory opinion on the issue.  See
Advisory Opinion, supra note 68, at para. 14.
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immaterial if the national government perceives it to be otherwise.
The lack of detailed criteria for office is comparatively easy to 
rectify.  Pursuant to article 21(1) the judges shall be of high moral 
character and must either possess the qualifications required for 
appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognised 
competence.  These criteria are broad and call for further 
elaboration.  The Committee of Ministers has developed guidelines 
on the selection of candidates for the post of judge at the ECtHR that 
must be implemented by the Contracting Parties.  The guidelines 
explain the essential qualities the candidates should possess: apart 
from those mentioned in the Convention, the candidates need to 
have knowledge of the national legal system(s) and of public 
international law.  The candidates should not engage in any activity 
incompatible with their independence, impartiality or with the 
demands of a full-time office if elected, for the duration of their term 
of office.72
The removal of the national representation requirement would 
considerably lessen any partisan interest a national government 
might have in the nomination of a judge, as they could not be 
certain the judge would sit on cases where it was a respondent.  
Moreover, the domestic nomination procedures should be modified 
to ensure that they are all transparent and politically neutral.73 The 
Committee of Ministers has set an Advisory Panel of Experts on 
Candidates for Election as Judge to the ECtHR, which can advise the 
Contracting Parties whether candidates for election as judges of the 
ECtHR meet the criteria for office.74 According to the Resolution of 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe that 
established this Panel, before submitting a list to the PACE, each 
Contracting Party will forward the names and CVs of the intended 
candidates to the Panel.  If the Panel finds that all of the persons put 
forward by a Contracting Party are suitable candidates, no further 
comments will be provided.  Where it is likely the Panel may find one 
72. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GUIDELINES OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS ON THE 
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES FOR THE POST OF JUDGE AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS - EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM (2012), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDo
c.jsp?id=1919201&Site=CM.
73. LIMBACH, supra note 17, 5  6. 
 74. COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, RESOLUTION CM/RES(2010)26 ON THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ADVISORY PANEL OF EXPERTS ON CANDIDATES FOR ELECTION AS 
JUDGE TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, at para. 1 1 (Nov. 10, 2010) 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1704555&Site=CM. 
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or more candidates not suitable for office, the chair of the Panel 
contacts the Contracting Party concerned to inform it or to request 
comments.  This is done confidentially.  If the Contracting Party 
persists with its choice then the views of the Panel are confidentially 
forwarded to the PACE.75 While the creation of this panel is 
undoubtedly a positive development, it does not prevent the 
Contracting Parties from submitting inadequate candidates.  The 
States are not bound by the conclusions of the Panel, as it is a merely 
advisory panel, and can submit their list even if it received negative 
feedback.  That said, the fact that the opinion of the Panel will become 
known to the PACE raises the chances the Contracting Parties will 
take its recommendations seriously.
The abovementioned guidelines on the selection of candidates 
do not only contain a longer list of criteria for the office but also 
enshrine procedural recommendations of the national nomination 
process.  The explanatory memorandum to these guidelines 
provides the States should have:
[A] stable and established procedure [which] reflects the rule of 
law principles of transparency and consistency, and thus also 
legal certainty.  Applicants and the general public should be able 
to rely upon a certain procedure being followed, although that 
procedure need not be the same for every successive selection 
process.  The need for accessibility of details of the procedure 
reflects the principle of transparency.  Applicants and the general 
public should be able to know in advance the procedure that will 
be followed.76
These rules should be endorsed because they increase the 
chances the most skilful individuals will be selected.  However, as 
was rightly pointed by the Consultative Council of European 
Judges, what is critical is not the perfection of principle . . . it is the 
putting into full effect of principles already developed.77 Even 
75. Id. at para. 5.
76. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MINISTERS DEPUTIES, EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM.
GUIDELINES OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS ON THE SELECTION OF CANDIDATES FOR 
THE POST OF JUDGE AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2010),
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1919201&Site=CM.
77. CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN JUDGES, FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE 
COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ON STANDARDS CONCERNING THE 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE IRREMOVABILITY OF JUDGES, OPINION NO. 1,
(2001), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CCJE(2001)O
P1&Sector=secDGHL&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=FE
F2E0&BackColorIntranet=FEF2E0&BackColorLogged=c3c3c3.
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after the guidelines had been adopted some nomination procedures 
remain non-transparent and vulnerable to political manipulation.78
Some states treat their national judges in international tribunals as 
their ambassadors aiming to promote their interests.79 This ideology 
is totally unacceptable in the context of human rights courts, and 
this should be clearly and consistently emphasised by the Council of 
Europe. 
The Council of Europe should ensure the nomination process 
includes as many stake holders as possible in order to lend 
credibility to the process.  The following criticism of the current 
nomination process should be properly addressed: 
States rarely confer with civil society, such as human rights 
organisations, bar associations and, perhaps most critically, judicial 
bodies.  In cases where civil society is consulted, the opaque nature 
of procedures means that the impact of such consultations is 
unclear.80
However, the Council of Europe is limited in what it can do to 
ensure implementation of the Guidelines and other relevant rules.  
Nonetheless, the fact remains that the judiciary of the ECtHR is 
almost exclusively drawn from the initial list submitted by the 
national Governments.  Any manipulation of the process by political 
actors is likely to seriously undermine the credibility of the court if it 
brings the process itself into disrepute, or if it means less-than-
capable jurists are appointed for partisan reasons.  Therefore, the 
integrity of the process must be safeguarded as rigorously as 
possible.
78. With a few exceptions, governments shunned any public advertising for 
candidates. In a few cases they advertised within a closed circle. Some seem even to 
have taken unsolicited applications into account.  LIMBACH, supra note 17, at 67-68.  
Loucaides further argues that [t]here were countries in which the selection was 
made on the basis of criteria such as the friendly relations of the candidate with 
influential political personalities or the affiliation of the person proposed with the 
political party in power.  Loucaides, supra note 70. Human Rights Watch sent a 
letter to the ECtHR regarding pitfalls in nomination of candidates from Russia in 
2012.  The letter mentions the following: very brief contest period, the contest was 
not broadly advertised, lack of transparency in relation to the selection committee 
and the fact that civil society was not at all consulted.  Letter from Hugh 
Williamson, Executive Director Human Rights Watch, to Klas de Vries, Chairman 
of Sub-Committee on Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights 
(Apr. 11, 2012), available at http://www.hrw.org /news/2012/04/11/letter-
european-court-human-rights-regarding-selection-procedure-candidates-russian-
79. Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 14, at 34.
80. LIMBACH, supra note 17, at 18.
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2. Interview with the Candidates
After States nominate their candidates, the nominees proceed to
an interview conducted by the Sub-Committee on the election of 
Judges to the European Court of Human Rights.  In 2003 the 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, of which the Sub-
Committee is part, presented a report that provided some guidance 
as to the considerations the Sub-Committee should look to when 
assessing a candidate.81 This report includes an assessment of the 
integrity and independence of the candidate.82 However, the 
interviews with the candidates are extremely brief and it is doubtful
the proper evaluation of a candidate for such an important position 
can be completed in 15 minutes.83 Given the fact that the 2003 report 
indicated twelve separate criteria to consider, this leaves 1.5 minutes 
to assess the nominee on each criterion.
Further criticism has been levelled at the personnel of the Sub-
Committee itself.  Lord Hoffmann has emphasised the lack of legal 
background of the members of the Sub-Committee.84 The inclusion
of independent experts in the Sub-Committee would increase its 
legitimacy and credibility.
The Sub-Committee also presents a potential arena in which 
political influence can be brought to bear in the interview process 
itself.  This can again be remedied by implementing a more 
transparent process.  For example, the Sub-Committee should be 
able to conduct a more profound check on the candidates beyond 
the formal CV it is presented and prepare a report on each 
candidate.  This report, containing open source materials, should be 
available to the members of the PACE before an election is held.
3. Election
The final stage of the appointment process is the election held by 
81. EUR. CONSULT. ASS., CANDIDATES FOR THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS, (2003), 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=1034
8&Language=EN.
82. Id. at para. 56.
83. LIMBACH, supra note 17, at 5. It seems that currently interviews go for about 
30 minutes, it nevertheless leaves very little time for an in-depth assessment of the 
merits of the candidates. Often interviews for entry level positions at law firms can 
last for a couple of days and the position of the ECtHR judge is considerably more 
important than entry level law firm positions.
84. See generally, Lord Hoffmann, supra note 18, at 429.
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the PACE.  While judges elected by the members of the PACE cannot 
claim the same level of democratic legitimacy as representatives 
elected directly by people, this important stage can increase the 
credibility of the judges.  This is particularly important because mass 
media often criticise the ECtHR judges as being unelected officials 
challenging decisions of elected parliaments.85 The election of judges 
provides an additional mechanism for enhancing the legitimacy of 
the Court.86
Despite its legitimacy-enhancing potential, the election of judges 
by the PACE has been criticised for two primary reasons.  First, while 
members of the PACE now possess basic information about the 
relevant qualifications of the candidates, they lack sufficient 
information to make an informed decision about the candidates 
suitability for the position.87 Second, Member States lobby in favour 
of their preferred candidate.88
One answer to the first criticism could be to prepare reports as 
advocated above.  Another option would be to ensure the 
participation of the PACE members in the election beyond the 
report of the Sub-Committee.  A simple question and answer session 
would give the members of the PACE more insight into the qualities 
of the candidates and would allow them to make more informed 
choices.  The authors appreciate that the PACE sessions are very 
short and have a very intensive agenda.  However, potential 
85. We may have become wearily accustomed to the crazy verdicts of the 
unelected European Court of Human Rights, which appears to delight in taking 
sides with rapists, murderers and terrorists against the British public.  But even by 
the standards of this pack of remote, often poorly qualified Eurocrats, todays 
judgment in favour of Abu Qatada defies logic.  James Slack, Unelected Euro Judges 
are Bringing Terror to the Streets of Britain, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 18, 2012) (emphasis 
added), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2087831/Abu-Qatada-
human-rights-Unelected-euro-judges-bringing-terror-streets-
Britain.html#ixzz2Rs4oGIyD. 
86. Nicolas Bratza, The Relationship Between the UK Courts and Strasbourg Eur., 
HUM. RTS. L.REV. 505, 506 (2011).
87. The candidates are rarely much known across Europe because very well-
known lawyers are often reluctant to leave their domestic practice behind and go to 
Strasbourg for 9 years.  Judge Hedigan (a former judge elected in respect to Ireland) 
in his interview explained that he had to leave his successful practice as a barrister 
in Dublin for some vague career prospect as a Strasbourg judge elected in 1998 
when the permanent Court was just created.  See TERRIS, supra note 4, at 214.
88. Some commentators argue that [l]obbying by States, and occasionally by 
judicial candidates, jeopardises the future independence (actual and apparent) of 
judges.  LIMBACH, supra note 17, at 9.
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workload cannot overweigh the goal of ensuring that the nominees 
of sufficiently high calibre are elected to the ECtHR.
A more transparent process also responds to criticism of the 
ability of Member States to lobby for their preferred candidates.  
When members of the PACE lacked sufficient information to make 
an independent and informed choice, the national delegations often 
became the source of information about the nominees.89 The 
possibility of partisan influence in such circumstances is obvious.  
The solution is to provide sufficient information to the PACE that is 
independently verified in order to ensure an informed decision can 
be made without relying on information from backroom channels.
The election process can be manipulated by the Contracting 
Parties through an opaque nomination process, through the provision 
of insufficient information to the PACE, and through lobbying of the 
members of the PACE.  These issues have to be addressed in order to 
ensure the independence of the Court.  If the national representation 
rule is abandoned, then the national interest in manipulating the 
process dissipates.  If it is not possible to get rid of the national 
representation rule, these reforms will also increase the transparency of 
the whole process, which is crucially important to maintain public trust 
in the institution.90
B. Principle of National Representation and Ad-Hoc Judges
Article 26(4) of the ECHR states:
There shall sit as an ex officio member of the Chamber and the 
Grand Chamber the judge elected in respect of the High 
Contracting Party concerned.  If there is none or if that judge is 
unable to sit, a person chosen by the President of the Court from a 
list submitted in advance by that Party shall sit in the capacity of 
judge.
89. One of the members of the PACE has described the voting process prior to 
the establishment of the Sub-Committee in the following terms: We would be 
presented with the names of three people.  We would be told to vote for one of 
them but, usually, no one told us anything about the three people.  One could 
sometimes obtain a little information from the delegation of the country whose judges we 
were about to select.  However, sometimes we would have been better off sticking a 
pin in the piece of paper to determine our choice of vote. Indeed, on a number of
occasions I flatly refused to exercise the vote because I knew nothing about the 
candidates.  Lord Hardy of Wath, House of Lords, 592 HANSARD 81 (1998) 
(emphasis added).
90. See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 345  346.
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This provision creates numerous threats to the judiciary of the 
ECtHR.  First, this provision creates an incentive for the Member 
States to push to elect an individual who is most likely to act in the 
States interest.  Second, Member States may be tempted to try to 
sway the decision of a judge hearing a case.  This seems to be a 
mainly theoretical problem, as there is scant evidence such attempts 
have been made.91 However, stakeholders may perceive this as a 
conflict of interest, which creates a legitimacy problem for the court.  
Third, if the judge cannot hear the case, the principle of appointing 
an ad-hoc judge compounds the first two problems as ad-hoc judges 
are not subjected to the same level of institutional scrutiny as 
permanent judges
National representation is a principle that has been embraced by 
many different international tribunals.  For example, in the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) both parties to the case is entitled 
to have a judge of their nationality on the bench.92 There is a 
significant difference between tribunals such as the ICJ and the 
ECtHR.  The former do not deal with individual complaints.93 If the 
principle of equal representation were applied strictly to the ECtHR, 
then individual complainants should also be afforded representation.  
Applying this principle would undermine the legitimacy of the 
ECtHR, and it demonstrates the inadvisability of extending a direct 
parallel from other international tribunals to the ECtHR.  Even in 
international tribunals, national judges do not always act as a national 
representative on the bench.94
91. LIMBACH, supra note 17, at 18.
92. Under art. 31, paras. 2 and 3, of the Statute of the Court, a State party to a 
case before the International Court of Justice which does not have a judge of its 
nationality on the Bench may choose a person to sit as judge ad hoc in that specific 
case under the conditions laid down in arts. 35 to 37 of the Rules of Court.  See
Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 31(2)-(3), 35-37, June 26, 1945, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]; see also Judges Ad Hoc, INTL CT. JUST. (2014), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=5.
93. See Judges Ad Hoc, supra note 92; ICJ Statute, supra note 92 at art. 34, para. 1.
94. While there is no consensus among commentators on whether nationality 
influences the voting of the judges it makes little difference to this discussion since 
justice should not be only done but should be seen to be done.  For more detailed 
analysis of correlations between voting and nationality. See TERRIS, supra note 4, at 
153; Rosalyn Higgins, Remarks by Rosalyn Higgins in Alternative Perspectives on the 
Independence of International Courts, 99 AM. SOCY INT'L. L. PROC. 135, 137 (2005); Eric A. 
Posner & Miguel F. P. Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased?, 34 J.
LEGAL STUD. 599 (2005); Lucius Caflisch, Independence and Impartiality of Judges: The 
European Court of Human Rights, 2 LAW AND PRAC. INTL CTS. & TRIBUNALS 169 (2003).
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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) is a 
regional human rights body in which individuals can make claims 
against States.95 The ECtHR is more similar to the IACtHR than the 
ICJ. The issue of national representation was the subject of an 
advisory opinion delivered by the IACtHR, which stated judges 
nominated by a particular Contracting Party could not be on the 
bench when this Contracting Party is a respondent in the case.96
This approach should be adopted by the ECtHR. 
The national representation rule also creates a procedural 
anomaly when decisions are reviewed.  The judge elected from a 
particular Member State sits in the Chamber, but also in the Grand 
Chamber if the case is reviewed.  In this case the judge will be the 
one to review her own decision made at the Chamber level.97
The text of the Convention itself makes clear that there is a 
possibility that national representation may give rise to a perception 
of bias.  Article 26.3 states that when sitting as a single judge, the 
judge cannot deal with applications which relate to the Member 
State of which they are a national. This is clearly predicated on the 
basis that such a situation would give rise to a perception of bias.  
However, it is not clear how the perception of bias disappears when 
the case proceeds to consideration on the merits; the judge still sits 
in consideration of the case.  The perception of bias is merely 
reduced given the fact that the judge in question casts only one vote 
amongst others. This still admits the underlying possibility of bias.
95. See art. 25 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, at 5 (Inter-Am. Comm'n 
H.R. Oct. 19, 2010).
96. The IACtHR stated that the question of a judges nationality is a factor that 
must be taken into account by the Court to strengthen the perception of the judges 
impartiality . . . . [I]t is possible to conclude, with the same validity, that the titular 
judge national of the respondent State must not participate in contentious cases 
originated in individual petitions.  Art. 55 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (Argentina), Ser. OC-20, para. 84 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Advisory Opinion of Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/do 
cs/opiniones/seriea_20_ing.pdf.
97. Pursuant to art. 23 of the ECHR, there shall sit as an ex-officio member of the 
Chamber and the Grand Chamber, the judge elected in respect of the Contracting 
Party concerned.  If there is none or if that judge is unable to sit, a person chosen by 
the President of the Court from a list submitted in advance by that Party shall sit in 
the capacity of judge.  It often means that the same judge has to sit in both Chamber 
and Grand Chamber hearings if the case was referred to the Grand Chamber 
pursuant to art. 43 ECHR.  European Convention on Human Rights, art. 23, Sept. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
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Moreover, there is some statistical evidence to indicate the 
perception of bias may be more than a perception.  In his survey of 
decision-making in the ECtHR, Voeten  observed national judges 
voted in favour of their state in 24 out of 32 cases in which national 
judges held the casting vote and did so in favour of their State in 24 
instances.  Voeten points out the hung nature of the decision 
means the case was likely to be 50-50, and therefore the inclusion of 
the national judge in these instances meant that national 
governments likely avoided a finding of liability in 8 cases.98
Although this is a statistically small number in the context of all of 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, it was a considerable defeat for the 
applicants.
Even more invidious is the corollary of national representation 
which provides for ad-hoc judges to be called when the elected 
judge is not available or cannot sit in a particular case.  These ad-hoc 
judges do not enjoy all the protections of elected judges.99
Moreover, the ad-hoc judges are more amenable to outside influence 
than elected judges.  Before Protocol 14 came into force the ad-hoc 
judges were appointed by the State for a particular case.  This was 
an inherently problematic situation.  Protocol 14 obliges the 
Contracting Parties to submit a list of 3-5 names.  This was a direct 
result of Ukraines actions, which resulted in appointing an ad hoc 
judge for a prolonged period of time.  In this case Ukraine submitted 
the list of three candidates, then withdrawn this list and 
subsequently was not able to submit the final list.100
Such manipulation undermined the independence and 
credibility of the ECtHR.  The procedure under Protocol 14 is 
therefore a marked improvement, but even under the new 
98. Voeten, supra note 8, at 426.
99. At the very minimum these judges do not live in Strasbourg and continue 
working in their home states. Often their career is much more dependent on the 
authorities than the careers of the permanent judges. 
100. PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, AD HOC JUDGES AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW. INFORMATION REPORT. COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, para. 3 (2012), http://www.coe.int/t/dgi/brighton-
conference/Documents/PACE_documents/AP_DOC_12827_EN.pdf; For more 
background information on the issue See PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY,
RECONSIDERATION ON SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS OF PREVIOUSLY RATIFIED CREDENTIALS OF 
THE UKRAINIAN DELEGATION (RULE 9 OF THE ASSEMBLYS RULES OF PROCEDURE).
REPORT. COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2009),
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-
ViewHTML.asp?FileID=12239&lang=EN.
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procedure, there are still Contracting Parties that have not yet 
submitted their lists101 and some have been submitted with fewer 
than three names.102 The new procedure has been criticised by the 
Council of Europe.  According to Protocol 14, if the list is submitted, 
then the President of the Court selects one judge from the list for a 
particular case.  The Report prepared by the Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights by the Council of Europe stated:
[T]he appointment procedure may still give rise to a legitimacy 
problem in that the ad hoc judge is appointed from a list 
submitted by the states parties directly to the President of the 
Court, whereas the Assembly remains excluded from the process. 
Not only does the procedure therefore lack democratic legitimacy, 
it is also unclear how the President of the Court will choose the ad 
hoc judge from the list provided by the state.103
The lack of criteria according to how the President of the Court 
should select a judge for a particular case can create an impression 
the decision was made arbitrarily. 
These threats to the independence of the Court stem from the 
principle of national representation.  If this principle is removed, the 
need to appoint ad-hoc judges disappears.  The removal of the 
principle would also eradicate any perceived bias in the decision-
making process, and would dissuade governments from manipulating 
the election process. 
One can argue a national judge is able to explain certain 
national particularities, e.g. national background, laws, traditions, to 
other judges.  While it would be beneficial to have a national judge 
serve as a resource to other judges, it is not clear why such a judge 
should be allowed to vote.  Furthermore, the appointment of a non-
judicial rapporteur, who could be a lawyer, or a national of the 
respondent state, would also address this concern.
Tomuschat argues national representation is important because 
States must be able to trust that their legitimate concerns are taken 
101. See, e.g., Armenia, Denmark or Hungary. List of Ad Hoc Judges, EUR. CT.
HUM. RTS., (Mar. 20, 2014) http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/List_adhoc_jud
ges_BIL.pdf.
102. See, e.g., Andorra or Spain.  Id.
103. EUR. PARL. ASS. COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AD HOC 
JUDGES AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW, para. 14 (2011)
[hereinafter Ad Hoc Judges Overview], http://www.assembly.coe.int/Comm
itteeDocs/2011/ajdoc36_2011.pdf.
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into account with the requisite care.104 It is not clear, however, 
what concerns Tomuschat considers legitimate, but any expansion 
beyond legal concerns, for example, diplomatic concerns would 
surely be inappropriate for the judiciary to consider.  Any legitimate 
legal concerns can be met by the appointment of effective counsel to 
appear before the court.  Any such concerns should surely be 
presented to the ECtHR during the course of argument.
Practical difficulties exist in securing the unanimous assent of 
the Contracting Parties required to enact such a change.  However, 
some movement towards reform in this area is evident in the report 
by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights:
The principle of national representation and, hence, in most 
instances, the institution of an ad hoc judge, must be carefully 
balanced against the risk posed to the Court by a lack of 
legitimacy and independence of judges.  The states parties, the 
Court and the Assembly must all play a part in achieving this 
balance.105
In light of the foregoing analysis, this paper advocates the 
removal of the principle of national representation in toto, in line 
with the practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  The 
legitimate concerns of the Member States can be met by the 
appointment of non-judicial rapporteurs, or through the 
appointment of a judge of that State in a non-voting capacity.  A 
debate about the existence of the national representation rule 
could reveal the views of the Member States regarding the judicial 
independence of the ECtHR.  It could expose any State that still 
believes such a judge is merely a national representative on the 
Court. 
C. Social Security and Immunities
The removal of the national representation principle would 
greatly reduce the likelihood Member States would be able to 
manipulate the Court by influencing their own nationals.  This 
paper assumes that national representation will remain for the 
104. Christian Tomuschat, National Representation of Judges and Legitimacy of 
International Jurisdictions: Lessons from ICJ to ECJ? in THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: 6TH INTERNATIONAL ECLN-
COLLOQUIUM/IACL ROUND TABLE BERLIN, 2-4 NOVEMBER 2005 183, 184 (Ingolf 
Pernice, et al. eds. 2006).
105. Ad Hoc Judges Overview, supra note 100, at para. 37.
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foreseeable future because attempts to abandon it will require 
support of all 47 Contracting Parties.  However, even if national 
representation is abandoned, external actors can utilize other 
strategies to undermine the Court.  These will also be considered.
The keys to judicial independence depend largely on prosaic, 
yet important concerns, including judicial salaries, pensions and 
immunities. While ECtHR judges receive comparatively high 
salaries,106 the development of an equivalent network of support in 
areas other than salaries is not as advanced.  The judges of the 
ECtHR do not have the status of national judges in some countries107
and they are treated as unemployed insofar as national labour law is 
concerned.108 This can have a detrimental effect on the retirement 
prospects of the judge.  In 2007, Judge Hedigan complained that 
[t]he conditions of work here [in the ECtHR] are extremely poor for 
the judges, despite the fact that, like most people at international 
level, they get a fairly high salary. . . judges have no social 
protection at all.  Indeed, they are treated almost as though they are 
nonpersons!109
A significant step forward in providing social protection for 
judges was the adoption of the resolution of the Committee of 
Ministers CM/Res(2009)5 on the Status and Conditions of Service 
of Judges of the European Court of Human Rights and of the 
Commissioner for Human Rights.110 This resolution confirmed 
elected members of the Court should enjoy the special status of
judges of the European Court of Human Rights.111 This 
106. In 2004 the basic salary was EUR 177,912.
107. As such this is not a problem: the ECtHR judges are not national judges.
108. This is the case in Russia.
109. TERRIS, supra note 4, at 214.
110. COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, RESOLUTION (2009)5 ON THE STATUS AND 
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF JUDGES OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND OF 
THE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 2 (2009) [hereinafter RESOLUTION 
(2009)5], https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1508697; for an overview of social 
security and pension entitlement see  COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, RESOLUTION (2013)34 ON THE NEED TO REINFORCE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Introductory Memorandum, 5 [hereinafter 
Introductory Memorandum] (available at http://www.assemb ly.coe.int/Commi
tteeDocs/2013/ajdoc34_2013.pdf).
111. See RESOLUTION (2009)5, supra note 110, at art. 1.  It is a replication of the 
statement enshrined in earlier Resolution (97)9 on the Status and Conditions of 
Service of Judges of the European Court of Human Rights to be Set up under 
Protocol no. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms adopted by the Committee of Ministers on September 10,
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resolution has clarified important aspects of social security such 
as annual leave, sick leave, maternity and paternity leave, and 
adoption leave.  Perhaps the most important aspect of the 
resolution was that it provided a pension scheme for the judges 
of the ECtHR.  Prior to the adoption of this measure, Mahoney 
observed  
[T]here is one international organisation whichat least at 
present (October 2008)signally fails to observe the minimum 
standard, namely the Council of Europe. The failing is located, not 
in an inadequacy of the pension, but in the total absence of any 
pension at all for the full-time judges of the Strasbourg Court.112
Pursuant to Article 10 of the Resolution the judges receive 
benefits from the Pension Scheme for staff members, which is in force 
at the Council of Europe at the time of their appointment.  This is a 
positive development in securing social benefits, and hence the 
independence of the judges.  The manner in which judges of the 
ECtHR enjoy their office, in particular the fact that they can be elected 
for only one 9-year term, makes an exact equivalence between judges 
and other employees of the Council of Europe questionable, but the 
provision of this scheme is undeniably better than having no 
provision at all before.
The issue of the functional and personal immunity of the judges 
is also crucial for ensuring the independence of the ECtHR.  Pursuant 
to Article 2 of the above mentioned Resolution, judges and ad hoc 
judges shall be entitled, during the exercise of their functions, to 
privileges and immunities.113 According to Article 18 of the General 
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe the 
judges are immune from legal processes in respect of what they say in 
their official capacity, they are exempt from taxation, and they are 
immune from immigration restrictions.  It is worth mentioning that all 
officials of the Council of Europe enjoy these immunities.  The Sixth 
Protocol to the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of 
the Council of Europe specifically regulates judicial immunities.  
Pursuant to this Protocol in addition to the above immunities the 
1997.  Mahoney has criticised the latter resolution stating that art. 1 declares the 
status but the Resolution offers no further specification as to what this special 
status entails or consists of. Paul Mahoney, Separation of Powers in the Council of 
Europe/ The Status of the European Court of Human Rights vis-a-vis authorities of the 
Council of Europe, 24 HUM. RTS. L.J. 152, 160 (2011).
112. Mahoney, supra note 4, at 332.
113. Resolution (2009)5, supra note 110.
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judges of the ECtHR, their spouses, and minor children have the 
privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to 
diplomatic envoys in accordance with international law.114 This norm 
provides the judges with the same privileges and immunities which 
are accorded to the Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General 
of the Council of Europe.115 It seems that the judges are well 
protected during their term in officethis protection is guaranteed 
by the formal immunities and privileges but also because they are 
based in Strasbourg116 and in the majority of cases are geographically 
detached from the pressures of their home countries.
The judges should also be protected when their term in office is 
over.  Pursuant to Article 3 of the Sixth Protocol to the General 
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe, 
in order to secure for the judges complete freedom of speech and 
independence in the discharge of their duties, the immunity from 
legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done 
by them in discharging their duties shall continue to be accorded, 
notwithstanding that the persons concerned are no longer engaged 
in the discharge of such duties.117 It means as soon as the judge 
retires, he or she is only immune in relation to what was said by this 
judge during his term in office.  All other immunities and privileges 
cease to exist in his or her respect.
D. Tenure and Accountability
Harvey argues that tenure is a measure of judicial 
independence.118 The length of tenure is consistently considered one 
of the aspects of judicial independence.  Shelton notes that life 
tenure is the least problematic from the point of view of 
independence.119 And while life tenure is unusual for international 
114. General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe
(Sixth Protocol), 250 UTS 12&32 (1949) [hereinafter Privileges and Immunities], 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/162.htm. See 
Also Introductory Memorandum, supra note 110, at 4-5. 
115. Andrew Drzemczewski, A Major Overhaul of the European Human Rights 
Convention Control Mechanism: Protocol 11, in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY 
OF EUROPEAN LAW 121, 195 (1995).
116. Resolution (2009)5, supra note 110.
117. See Privileges and Immunities, supra note 114.
118. Anne Harvey, What's So Great About Independent Courts? Reexamining the 
Economic Effects of Judicial Independence, DEPT. OF POL. N.Y.U. (2011).
119. INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA Minimum Standards of Judicial 
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tribunals we submit that it would be beneficial from the point of 
view of independence for the Court if the judges were protected by 
irremovability.120 If this suggestion is rejected by the Contracting 
Parties, an alternative solution can be adopted, namely providing a 
place for the former ECtHR judges in the senior judiciary of the 
Member State.
Pursuant to Article 23 of the Convention the judges are elected 
for a period of 9 years and cannot be reelected. This provision was 
adopted by Protocol 14.  Hitherto judges were elected for a period of 
6 years but they could be reelected once.  The possibility of re-
election was widely criticised as the main tool of influencing 
judges.121 They could be punished by the states for being too 
activist by not being included in the list for reelection.  It was 
pointed out that the Bulgarian authorities had not included Judge 
Gotchev in the list of candidates because of his vote in the Loukanov
case.122 National authorities did not necessarily have to hold out the 
possibility of punishment in order to alter a judges decision.  
Voeten found some evidence that countries with fewer attractive 
career opportunities available to judges after their tenure were more 
likely to decide in favour of their States.123 After Protocol 14 came 
into force, the direct threat of not being reappointed faded, but the
problem Voeten relates is not solved. 
Life tenure obviates this problem.124 Quite apart from the career 
perspective concern one can argue that life tenure will also increase 
the professional competence of the Court as a whole.125 In an ideal 
Independence (1982); Shelton, supra note 18, at 38.
120. Irremovability is a standard requirement for national judges.  The fact that 
ECtHR is an international court does not provide a reason for lack of 
irremovability.  According to Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)12 which enshrines 
basic guarantees for national judiciary.  COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, RECOMMENDATION 
(2010)12 TO MEMBER STATES ON JUDGES: INDEPENDENCE, EFFICIENCY AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES, para. 49 (2010), (Security of tenure and irremovability are key 
elements of the independence of judges. Accordingly, judges should have 
guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age, where such exists.) 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewD oc.jsp?id=1707137.
121. Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the 
Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INTL L.J. 271, 279 (2003); see also
Voeten, supra note 8, at 427.
122. LIMBACH, supra note 17, at 70.
123. Voeten, supra note 8, at 427.
124. Life tenure means that a retirement age can be stipulated.
125. Mahoney points out that [e]ven more problematic is the issue of 
underperforming or incompetent judges, as opposed to judges guilty of 
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situation new judges should be as competent in the area of ECHR law 
as the judges who spent some time in Strasbourg.  In reality it is likely 
that new judges are less familiar with the modus operandi of the Court 
and need some time to learn the procedure.126 With life tenure the 
judges will change less often meaning there will be fewer new 
inexperienced judges.  Another positive aspect of life tenure is that it 
will better ensure consistency and continuity of case law, again due to 
the fact that the judges will know the case law better.  Finally, it has 
been argued that the longer a judge stays in Strasbourg the more 
likely that judge becomes divorced from affinity towards the 
homeland.127 This would be a further guarantee of independence.  
We should specify that under life tenure we mean tenure until 
retirement at the age of 65 or 70.
It has been argued that a 9 year term is too short to make a real 
impact.128 Moreover, the fact that the judges have to go back to their 
states creates further challenges to their independence.129 There are 
suggestions that the judges that retire from the Court should have a 
guaranteed position in the Contracting Party.  One method of 
ensuring the continued protection of judges from national pressure 
would be to guarantee the individual would be appointed in a senior 
judicial position in their home country.  This is obviously a complex 
issue, given inter alia that the number of judges varies wildly between 
Member States,130 but the suggestion could be trialled by a Committee 
of Ministers recommendation and then migrate to the Convention if 
successful.  It is becoming increasingly recognised that the 
embeddedness of the Convention in the national legal orders is the 
key to the continued vitality of the Convention system.131 The 
proposed change would ensure judges familiar with the Convention 
system occupy high judicial office in the Member States and can act as 
impropriety.  Mahoney, supra note 4, at 344.
126. This is another criterion to be assessed by the Sub-Committee prior to 
appointment, but it suffers from the same structural issues outlined above in 
relation to assessment by the Sub-Committee.
127. Voeten, supra note 8, at 420.
128. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou Interviews with the Judges of the ECtHR.
129. Voetens empirical study substantiates this point.  Voeten, supra note 8, at 
427; see also, Karlan, supra note 66, at 544; Mahoney, supra note 4, at 325.
130. These include areas such as the number of vacancies, technical requirements, 
etc.
131. See Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: 
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19
EUR. J. INTL L. 125 (2008).
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ambassadors for the ECtHR in the national judiciary.  This is an 
argument in favour of this proposal that is not based on purely 
judicial independence concerns, and may cut against the arguments 
for life tenure. 
A minimum age requirement for the candidates for the position 
of a judge has been discussed, but has not been implemented yet.  If 
life tenure is accepted it becomes even more important to implement 
a minimum age requirement.  Coupling this with life tenure could 
enhance the credibility132 of the Court and contribute to the 
acceptance of life tenure, because requiring a substantial amount of 
experience will prevent judges from serving extremely long terms.  
Drzemczewski rightly argues that
Although the Convention does not specify a minimum age for the 
post of judge on the Court, it can be argued that such an age limit 
ought to be imposed. . . . A requirement, as suggested by the 
former Swedish judge on the Court, Elisabeth Palm, that 
candidates possess at least 10 to 15 years of relevant work 
experiencewhich implies a certain age requirementmerits 
serious consideration.133
Some commentators suggest life tenure is not an ideal or even 
feasible solution in the context of an international tribunal.134 New 
judges may bring more up-to-date knowledge of local law and 
better explain new developments in their legal systems.  However, 
some judges recently elected had long international careers working 
for various international organisations, and following this logic, ties 
with their national states would have diminished.135 So, at least in 
respect to these appointees, this argument does not stand.  
Furthermore, the fact that national judges are invariably attached to 
cases involving their home countries ensures they have some 
continued expertise in the local law of the country.  In general, life 
tenure can be a crucial safeguard of the independence of the 
132. It has been argued that sometimes the States have proposed candidates who 
have been only recently out of law school.  LIMBACH, supra note 17, at 16.
133. Andrew Drzemczewski, Election of Judges to the Strasbourg Court: an 
Overview, EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 377, 381  382 (2010).
134. Mahoney notes that there is no dispute that the substitution of unlimited 
for limited terms of office for international judges would be politically impossible.  
Mahoney, supra note 4, 327.
135. Current Judges Paul Mahoney, Hanna Yudkivska and Mark Villiger as well 
as former Judges Bratza, Loucaides, and Rozakis had international careers before 
being elected to the bench.
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Court.136
If life tenure is accepted then the appointment procedure would 
become even more important, and the changes related to these 
issues would become even more pressing.  Another pressing issue is 
the accountability of the ECtHR judges.  Accountability is not 
understood here as responsibility for the decisions they make in 
virtue of their discretion but rather accountability in a sense of 
judicial ethics and carrying on their duties free of bias.  In the most 
extreme cases the judge can be dismissed from office for unethical 
behaviour.  According to Article 23 of the ECHR no judge may be 
dismissed from office unless the other judges decide by a majority of 
two-thirds that that judge has ceased to fulfil the required 
conditions.137
The procedure for dismissal is further specified in the Rules of 
Court,138 which are complimented by the Resolution on Judicial 
Ethics adopted by the Plenary Court.  The Resolution, for example, 
prohibits engagement of the judges in activities outside the court 
unless those activities are compatible with independence, 
impartiality and the demands of their full-time office.  Pursuant to 
the Resolution judges must not accept any gift, favour or advantage 
that could call their independence or impartiality into question.139
These legal documents are designed to ensure proper 
accountability of judges.  However, no judge has ever been 
dismissed from an international tribunal for disciplinary reasons. 
Sometimes it is suggested the mere existence of these norms is 
enough to deter the judges from committing unethical acts.140 If the 
proposal of life tenure for the judges is accepted then the 
accountability of sitting judges should be taken even more seriously.  
136. Mackenzie and Sands argue in favour of tenure until retirement. While they 
accept that there are certain concerns they conclude that these concerns are 
trumped by the benefits to judicial independence. Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe 
Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International 
Judge, 44 HARV. INTL L.J. 271, 279 (2003).  Shelton points out that lifetime tenure or 
a lengthy tenure with no possibility of reelection would enhance the independence 
of judges and remove some of the political considerations that come with 
campaigns for re-nomination and election.  Shelton, supra note 18, at 38.
137. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 24, para. 2.
138. EUR. CT. H.R., RULES OF COURT, Rule 2, 7 (2014) [hereinafter RULES OF COURT], 
http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/rules_court_eng.pdf.
139. EUR. CT. H.R., RESOLUTION ON JUDICIAL ETHICS ADOPTED BY THE PLENARY COURT
(2008), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Resolution_Judicial_Ethics_EN G.pdf.
140. See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 342  343.
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Further consideration should be given to the grounds of dismissal to 
include hitherto unforeseen possibilities such as medical 
incompetence.
This section identified a number of areas which require reform. 
The abolition of national representation is the most straightforward, 
but also most politically difficult to secure.  A more informed 
election procedure, life tenure or appointment in the national legal 
system, and further protection in relation to pensions can 
significantly improve the independence and credibility of the 
ECtHR.
IV. The Registry of the Court
The discussion of independence in the ECtHR focuses almost 
exclusively on the independence of the judiciary.  This is somewhat 
misleading in that the judges rotate every 9 years, but the Registry 
of the Court operates as its institutional memory.  In order to assess 
the impact of the Registry on the independence of the Court, this 
paper will first consider the role the Registry plays in the operation 
of the Court.  It will then discuss three issues that can threaten the 
independence of the Registry: it will first look at the lawyers of the 
Registry seconded by the Contracting Parties; it will then discuss the 
non-renewability of the B-lawyers contracts; and it will finally 
examine the institutional independence of the Registry from the 
political organs of the Council of Europe.  A survey of the practical 
significance of the Registry in the work of the ECtHR demonstrates 
the extent to which reform of the Registry is necessary in order to 
avoid any possible damage to the Convention institutions.
A. The Role of the Registry
The Registry of the ECtHR is unseen, but it is heard.  For the 
majority of people it is unclear what the lawyers of the Registry do 
and what their impact on the Court agenda and decision-making is.  
While the judges are often in the spotlight, it is lawyers of the 
Registry who prepare the cases and often draft the judgments. 
The Registry is mentioned in the ECHR in Article 24 which 
provides: the Court shall have a Registry, the functions and 
organisation of which shall be laid down in the rules of the Court.  
After Protocol 14 entered into force the members of the Registry 
acquired a legal right to act as non-judicial rapporteurs assisting 
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judges sitting as single judges.141 One crucial safeguard is that the 
organisation of the Registry is undertaken by the Court itself.  As 
Sorel puts it, self-regulation is the prevailing system, which implies 
mutability of the rules of procedure within the framework of the 
statute.  This is an important source of independence and one of the 
ways in which such a creature may escape its makers.142
Formally the task of the Registry is to provide legal and 
administrative support to the Court in the exercise of its judicial 
functions.143 In fact this role goes beyond simple administrative 
support.  The former judge of the ECtHR Loucaides explains the 
role of the Registry in following terms:
In general, the substantial workstudying the application, the 
documents attached to it, preparing the report and suggesting the 
solutionwas done by the member of the Registry.  The extent of 
intervention, supervision and work of the judge Rapporteur 
depended on the personality, diligence and industry of the 
particular judge.  Not all the judges had such qualities.  The result 
was that the view of the member of the Registry frequently 
prevailed; he or she gave the direction to the solution of the case; 
i.e. whether the case should be declared admissible or 
inadmissible, whether it should be communicated and whether a 
violation should be found.144
The Registry seems to be able to crucially influence the judgments of 
the ECtHR; Loucaides calls its role decisive.145
The importance of the Registrys role calls into question the 
extent to which applicants feel that they can trust the legal system.  
Tyler points out people only value participation if the authority 
involved has considered their case.146 This can be allayed by 
providing reasons for the decision, but a perception that the 
decision has not been decided by the court can undermine this 
141. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 97, at art. 24(2).
142. Jean-Marc Sorel, International Courts and Tribunals, Procedure, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA PUB. INTL L. (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 2009).
143. COUNCIL EUR., SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS 
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Para. 28 (2011)
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Source/Publications/CM_ann
report2011_en.pdf,
144. Loucaides, supra note 70.
145. Id.
146. Tyler, supra note 62, at 889.
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element of procedural justice.  Furthermore, Tyler notes the 
importance that people ascribe to the neutrality of the decision-
making process.147 The fact that the Registry is an important, and 
sometimes decisive, element in the decision-making process makes 
any problem relating to a lack of neutrality particularly troubling.
The Registry has a pyramid structure, with the Registrar and 
Deputy Registrar(s) on the top, other lawyers working in the 
sections and finally the grade B-lawyers.  Each lawyer is assigned to 
the country of which they are a national.  This means the structure 
and roles of individual lawyers varies depending on the number of 
such lawyers assigned to a country, the size of the national backlog 
and other factors.  B-lawyers often deal with clearly inadmissible 
cases, they do preliminary filtering of the applications.148 B-lawyers 
are usually employed on a temporary basis, typically receiving four-
year nonrenewable contracts.  A-lawyers are usually permanently 
employed and often deal with more important meritorious cases.
This paper argues that the independence of the Registry 
requires greater discussion.  Taking into account its influence on the 
Court, it is important to maintain public trust in the Registry. 
B. Seconded Lawyers of the Registry
It is commonly accepted that the Court faces an unsustainable 
backlog of pending applications.  One possible solution to alleviate
the backlog is to increase the number of the lawyers working at the 
Registry.  Following the Interlaken and Izmir Declarations, the 
Contracting Parties were encouraged to send seconded lawyers to 
the Courts Registry.149 This idea was supported by the Court; the 
Registry of the Court even sent an information note to the 
representatives of the Contracting Parties requesting they provide 
147. Id. at 892.
148. Special filtering sections were set in relation to applications, which arrive 
from five of the highest case-count countries: Russia, Turkey, Romania, Ukraine 
and Poland.
149. COUNCIL EUR., INTERLAKEN DECLARATION: HIGH LEVEL CONFERENCE ON THE 
FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2010), 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1591969; COUNCIL EUR., IZMIR DECLARATION:
HIGH LEVEL CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
APRIL 26-27 (2011), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=IzmirDeclarat
ion&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2
&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864.
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seconded lawyers to the Courts Registry.150 The aim of tackling the 
backlog is very pressing but the means of solving this problem 
should not compromise the independence of the Court. 
Before turning to the arguments pro and contra having seconded 
lawyers in the Registry, some terminological clarification is needed. 
Seconded lawyers are funded by the Contracting Parties; in other 
words, their salaries are paid directly by the Contracting Party.  Often 
these salaries are smaller than salaries of regular employees of the 
Council of Europe  this on its own can contribute to an unhealthy 
environment in the Registry.  The shortlisting of the candidates is also 
done by the Contracting Party.  The seconded lawyers are finally 
selected by the Court from the shortlisted candidates.  Their contract 
usually lasts two years and it is non-renewable.  It should be noted 
that seconded lawyers worked in the Court even before the Interlaken 
Declaration.151 For instance, Sweden has been seconding judges to the 
ECtHR for a long period of time.  However, the number of seconded 
lawyers has increased significantly after the Interlaken Declaration.  
Russia, for example, sent 20 lawyers to work in the Courts 
Registry.152 The Registrar of the Court explained the purpose of 
secondment is twofold: on the one hand, it provides the Court with 
the assistance of experienced national lawyers with full knowledge of 
national legal systems; on the other, it feeds back into the national 
system Convention trained lawyers and therefore promotes more 
effective national implementation.153
This initiative has not received universal endorsement.  Russian 
civil society has reacted immediately and negatively.  For example, 
one of the leading Russian NGOs, Memorial, sent a letter to the 
Registrar of the Court questioning the real and perceived 
independence of the seconded lawyers.154
150. Information Note from the Registrar. Secondment to the Registry of National 
Lawyers, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS. (Aug. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Information Note], 
http://www.justice.gov.sk/SiteAssets/Lists/Aktuality/EditForm/informat%C3%
ADvna%20n%C3%B3ta.pdf
151. See, e.g., Letter from Erik Freiberg, Registrar of the ECHR, to Oleg Orlov, 
Head of Council of the Human Rights Centre, Memorial (Dec. 5, 2011) [hereinafter 
Letter from Freiberg], available at
http://www.memo.ru/eng/news/2011/12/29/2912 113.pdf; See Also Introductory 
Memorandum, supra note 110, at 7-8. 
152. Freiberg, supra note 151. 
153. See Information Note, supra note 150.
154. Id.
Dzehtsiarou Coffey FINAL MACRO 4/14/14 9:57 PM
310 Hastings Intl & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 37:2
In response to these concerns, the Registrar of the Court has 
advanced the following rationales to demonstrate seconded lawyers 
remain independent: first, they have to observe the Courts rules on 
confidentiality and, upon arrival, take the same oath or make the same 
solemn declaration as Registry staff; second, this practice existed for 
many years; third, the final selection will be undertaken by the Court; 
fourth, the candidates should be highly qualified and should speak 
English and French.155 While some of these reasons possess merely 
symbolic value, the fact that the Court makes the final selection cannot 
be ignored.
A number of judges of the ECtHR were questioned about their 
perception of the independence of seconded lawyers.  Judges and 
lawyers from new democracies were much more concerned about 
independence of the seconded lawyers than judges elected from 
more mature Western democracies.  Some admitted they had initial 
concerns, but have since been reassured by the role of the Court in 
the appointment process.156 However, one judge believed that 
members of the general public who do not have this internal 
knowledge might question the perceived independence of such 
lawyers, particularly given there are very few people who really 
know the ins and outs of the court.157 If such perceptions were to 
become widespread, they could potentially undermine the 
legitimacy of the Court.
Secondment is widespread in various international 
organisations and it has a long pedigree in the political bodies of the 
Council of Europe.158 However, there is a crucial difference between 
international political organisations and international tribunals.  
Secondments to the former can provide a useful operational fillip for 
these organisations; secondments to the latter can be detrimental.  
International organisations typically are composed of a number of 
disparate interests and one key concern of such organisations is the 
accommodation of such interests.  Therefore seconded members of 
international organisations provide an informational channel about 
the interests concerned.  The role of the ECtHR is to adjudicate 
155. Id.
156. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou Interviews with the Judges of the ECtHR.
157. Id.
158. The Council of Europe has recently adopted regulations for secondments to 
the Council of Europe. Eur. Consult. Ass,. Resolution CM/Res(2012)2, 1134th Sess., 
(Feb. 15, 2012).
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human rights disputes, not to accommodate conflicting interests.
Another reason that is often advanced by the Registry of the 
ECtHR in favour of seconded lawyers is that such lawyers are 
dealing with clearly inadmissible cases.  These are the cases which 
have already been looked at and no human rights violations were 
preliminarily identified, but because these cases had complex facts, 
they were not disposed of immediately.159 The task of the seconded 
lawyers is to bring these cases to completion.160
There is an inherent controversy in the use of seconded 
lawyers.  It aims to feed well trained lawyers back into the national 
legal systemlawyers who are aware of the ECHR standards.  
However, it is hardly possible to learn these standards by routinely 
disposing of inadmissible complaints.  The aim of secondment could 
be most effectively achieved if the seconded lawyers were national 
judges and were allowed, under supervision, to deal with the gamut 
of issues an ordinary lawyer of the Registry deals with.  This will be 
the most effective way to embed the norms of the Convention into 
the domestic legal order.  The internalisation of Convention norms 
by the national judiciary would provide an important conduit for 
the dissemination of Convention jurisprudence.  Also it is likely 
national judges will be more independent from the state than 
lawyers who might, for example, work as part of the civil service of 
the State.
The possible controversy of the seconded lawyer scheme means 
more open debate is needed to discuss this scheme.  This concern is 
reflected in the initiative of some members of the PACE, who tabled 
a motion for a resolution entitled Need to Reinforce the 
Independence of the European Court of Human Rights. This 
motion observed that
[T]he Brighton Declaration of 20 April 2012, adopted at the recent 
Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human 
Rights, underlined the need of maintaining a high-quality 
Registry, with lawyers chosen for their legal qualifications and
knowledge of the law and practice of States Parties, and 
encouraged greater use of secondments of national judges and 
lawyers. But situations may occur in which serious complaints 
against a given State may be dealt with by a seconded 
judge/lawyer who is paid by the State against which applications 
159. See Letter from Freiberg, supra note 151.
160. Id.
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are lodged and/or whose professional career may depend on the 
State concerned. Such a situation may create an intrinsic conflict 
of interest that can have an adverse impact on the effective 
independence of the Court.161
While having independent national judges as seconded lawyers 
who are supervised by experienced members of the Registry seems 
to be the most beneficial arrangement, it is clear that further 
consideration should be given to how seconded lawyers can affect 
the independence of the Registry.
C. Recruitment Policy
While the independence of regular lawyers is less problematic 
than seconded lawyers, the recruitment procedure poses challenges 
to the continued independence of the Registry.  A major portion of 
the lawyers of the ECtHR are employed on the basis of 4-year 
nonrenewable contracts.162 This is a blanket rule which provides no 
exceptions and in which merit plays no role.  This rule is relevant to 
the B-lawyers who normally deal with applications that have just 
been submitted to the ECtHR (there are currently more than 100,000 
pending applications).163 The role of B-lawyers is not decisive, but it 
is extremely important.  They are at the forefront of the Courts 
attempts to reduce its enormous docket.  However, the fact that 
every four years the Court has to train new inexperienced lawyers 
means they are not efficient in tackling the backlog.  At the same 
time well-trained, experienced lawyers who worked at the Court for 
four years are forced to leave irrespective of whether they wish to 
do so. 
The rationale behind this seemingly counter-intuitive human 
resources policy can be found in a broader social role the ECtHR 
claims to play.  The experienced lawyers leaving the Court after 4 
years of service are seen as ambassadors who are supposed to bring 
the values of the ECHR to the member states.  However, it does not 
always work this way.  Frequently, former lawyers of the ECtHR 
start working in other international organisations without any 
161. Eur. Parl. Ass., Motion for a Resolution. Need to Reinforce the Independence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, 3rd Part-Sess., Doc. No. 12940 (2012).
162. This system is called the Young Lawyers Scheme.  See Mahoney, supra note 
19, at 346.
163. The Courts backlog in 2012 was approximately 128,100 pending 
applications. EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., ANNUAL REPORT 2012, 149 (2013), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/D ocuments/Annual_report_2012_ENG.pdf. 
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considerable impact on their home countries.  Some of them remain 
in Strasbourg, studying at the University of Strasbourg or working 
at the law firms or NGOs.164 Of course, the Court should attempt to 
improve human rights in the Member States not only through their 
judgments but through training of well qualified personnel who 
return to the Member States.  However, even those B-lawyers who 
come back to the Member States are unlikely to create a critical mass 
of new informed lawyers that can support structural changes in the 
Member States due to an overall insignificant number of them.165
This policy is questionable not only from the point of view of 
the effectiveness of the Court, but also because it raises issues 
related to the independence of such lawyers.  It seems logical for the 
lawyers in the last year of their term in the Court to look for a new 
job.  Their career perspectives may be dependent on various 
considerations including loyalty to a particular state institution or 
private party.  As a result of these considerations, the policy of non-
renewability of the contracts should be changed and there should at 
least remain the possibility that the B-lawyers contracts could be 
extended.
D. Administrative Autonomy of the ECtHR from the Political 
Bodies of the Council of Europe
This article has been primarily concerned with the ways in 
which Member States can undermine the independence of the 
ECtHR and the Registry.  However, there is also an institutional 
threat to the independence of the ECtHR from the political bodies of 
the Council of Europe.  The Council of Europe is the ECtHRs parent 
organisation.  Lawyers and assistants working in the Courts 
Registry, for instance, are considered staff members of the Council 
of Europe and are subject to the Council of Europes Staff 
Regulations.166 The Courts budget is part of the general budget of 
164. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, One of the Keys to the ECtHR Problems, HUM. RTS.
IRELAND (Sept. 11, 2012), http://humanrights.ie/announcements/one-of-the-keys-
to-the-ecthr-problems/. 
165. This can be contrasted with the position of judges who return to Member 
States and occupy a senior position in a relatively numerable, but highly influential, 
judicial role.
166. Registry, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.echr.coe.in
t/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/How+the+Court+works/The+Registry/ (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2014).
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the Council of Europe.167
The ECtHR is closely linked to other institutions of the Council 
of Europe such as the PACE or the Committee of Ministers at least 
in the areas of finances and human resources.168 Some argue 
because the ECHR was drafted under the auspices of the Council of 
Europe, it is logical and appropriate that the Court is dependent on 
its parent institution to some extent.  This argument is not very 
convincing.  The Council of Europe does not have propriety rights 
in every treaty which was signed under the umbrella of this 
organisation.  Kruger and Polakiewicz argue that, the Convention 
is not an act of the Council itself, but an independent international 
treaty which may contain special regulations going beyond the 
Statutes provisions.169 Drzemczewski agreed, noting that [o]nly 
those links with the Council of Europe which are explicitly foreseen 
by the Treaty itself, maintain it in the sphere of the Organisation.170
Moreover, Mahoney has conducted a comprehensive historical 
overview of the relations between the Council of Europe and the 
ECtHR and concluded the Council of Europe de facto acknowledged 
the independence of the Courts Registry from the moment it was 
established.171
Many commentators including the current Registrar of the 
Court point out that normally the relations between the ECtHR and 
the Council of Europe are cooperative and mutually beneficial.  In 
some cases misunderstandings between the ECtHR and the Council 
of Europe have led to inefficient management of resources.172
167. Budget, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.echr.coe.int/ECH
R/EN/Header/The+Court/How+the+Court+works/Budget/ (last visited Mar. 9, 
2014).
168. Lambert-Abdelgawad E, The Court as a Part of the Council of Europe: the 
Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers, in CONSTITUTING EUROPE THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL 
CONTEXT 291, 291-292 (Follesdal A., Peters B., and Ulfstein G. eds. 2013).
169. Hans Christian Kruger & Jorg Polakiewicz, Proposals for a Coherent Human 
Rights Protection System in Europe/The European Convention on Human Rights and The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, 22 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 12 (2001).
170. Andrew Drzemczewski, The Prevention of Human Rights Violations: 
Monitoring Mechanisms of the Council of Europe, in THE PREVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS 139-177 (Linos-Alexander Sicilianos ed., 2001).
171. Mahoney, supra note 111, at 153 159.
172. Erik Fribergh, The Authority over the Court’s Registry within the Council of 
Europe Human Rights - Strasbourg View, in LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS WILDHABER 146 
(Lucius Caflisch et al. eds. 2007); see also, Mahoney, supra note 111, at 159.
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Furthermore, in times of economic crisis the tensions between 
institutions173 might become aggravated due to tightening fiscal 
constraints.  Mahoney points out that 
[I]n recent years, within the Council of Europe, there have been 
disquieting signs of a tendency to swim against this universal tide 
[of the operational independence of international courts], through 
revived attempts by the executive arm of the Council of Europe to 
assume ultimate responsibility, in place of the Court, for staff 
appointments and structures, for budgetary preparations, for 
internal working methods, and so on.174
One solution to these problems of misunderstanding and power 
balancing would be to subordinate the Courts Registry to the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe. This logistical solution 
is totally unacceptable from the point of view of the rule of law. The 
Council of Europe is an organisation of states: it does not claim it is 
completely independent from its Member States.  Arguably, such 
independence is not only unnecessary but is positively undesirable 
in the case of the Council of Europe, because it is an arena for 
political negotiations and for promoting human rights, rule of law 
and democracy via political routes. However, the nature of the 
ECtHR is different and the fact that independence is crucial 
component of the Court has been established in section 1 of this 
paper.  Therefore, the Court must be independent not only from the 
influence of the Contracting Parties per se but also from the political 
entities that are the Secretary General and the Committee of 
Ministers.175
This paper does not advocate a complete separation between 
the ECtHR Registry and the political arms of the Council of Europe.  
The Committee of Ministers, the PACE and the Secretary-General 
play an important role in ensuring the effectiveness of the 
Convention system.  The Committee of Ministers, for instance, 
supervises the execution of the Courts judgments.  The symbiotic 
nature of the Convention system renders a divorce of the ECtHR 
Registry and the political branches of the Council undesirable.  That 
being said, the Courts autonomy should be protected. 
This article suggests the institutional autonomy of the ECtHR 
173. See Fribergh, supra note 172, 154155 (discussion of practical examples of 
such challenges).
174. Mahoney, supra note 19, at 347.
175. Mahoney, supra note 111, at 158.
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Registry can be secured by the articulation of clear and 
straightforward rules of interaction between the Registry on one 
side and the Secretariat General and the Committee of Ministers on 
the other.176 Until now the relations between the Council of Europe 
and the ECtHR were based on ad hoc rules and de facto support of 
the Court from the Secretary Generals.177 The growth of the Courts 
importance means a more coherent legal architecture governing 
relations between the ECtHR and the Council of Europe is 
necessary.  Such rules can be established through the formal 
agreement between the ECtHR and the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe.  The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and 
the Organisation of American States came to a similar agreement.178
It has been suggested that the Statute of the Council of Europe 
should also reflect the importance of the ECtHR.179 The Statute was 
drafted before the ECtHR came into existence.  Nowadays, the 
Court is arguably the most prestigious institution in the Council of 
Europe, and this state of affairs has to be reflected in its 
Constitutionthe Statute.
Two areas that would certainly require regulation in such a 
scheme are the Courts autonomy on the issues of human resources 
and financial independence.  The discussion of the Courts 
independence in relation to human resources usually covers the 
following themes:
1. Should members of Registry180 be considered Council of 
Europe staff?  At present the lawyers of the Registry are staff 
176. As the President of the Court, Judge Luzius Wildhaber, said . . . to the Wise 
Persons Group: There is a striking gap in the Council of Europes institutional 
arrangements, which lack a clear text setting out the Courts status and its 
relationship with its staff. The plain terms of the Convention have yet to be 
reflected in an appropriate instrument at Council of Europe level.  Mahoney, supra 
note 19, 347.
177. Fribergh, supra note 172, at 155.
178. See generally Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to the 
 Special Committee on Inter-American Summits Management, Agreement between 
the General Secretariat of the Organisation of American States and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights on the Administrative Operation of the Courts 
Secretariat, May 7 1998, OEA/Ser.G CE/GCI-134/98 (discussing in pertinent part, 
the Principle of juez natural the competent, independent, and impartial judge or 
court) available at http://www.summit-americas.org/CEGCI%20Docs/ce-gci-134-
98-English.htm.
179. Mahoney, supra note 19, 347.
180. Members of the Registry include assistants, IT services, and other 
administrative personnel.
Dzehtsiarou Coffey FINAL MACRO 4/14/14 9:57 PM
2014] Legitimacy and Independence of International Tribunals 317
members of the Council of Europe,181 however there are convincing 
arguments against the status quo.  Presently Registry staff members 
have to take the oath or make the solemn declaration expressing 
their loyalty to the Court (not only to the Council of Europe).182 This 
is because the lawyers of the Registry should be independent, not 
only from their individual States, but from the political branches of 
the Council of Europe.
The unity of the Council of Europe staff can arguably be 
undermined by this special status of the ECtHR staff especially in 
relation to staff mobilitytransfers from the Court to various bodies 
of the Council of Europe.183 This argument however is questionable 
for at least two reasons.  First, as was eloquently pointed out by Paul 
Mahoney, other international tribunals maintain separate staff from 
their parent organisations without undermining the unity of staff 
between these organisations.184 Second, even if there will be some 
distancing between the Council and the Court, the latter is a special 
body which should be autonomous, and this justifies such 
distancing.  Unity of staff is a positive feature of the Strasbourg 
system, and both the Court and the Council of Europe should 
benefit from transfers of highly qualified lawyers; however this 
unity is not a sufficient trade-off compared to possible damage it 
may cause to the perceived independence of the Court. 
2. The special status of the Courts Registry staff is closely 
181. The ECtHR website states: Registry staff members are staff members of the 
Council of Europe, the Courts parent organisation, and are subject to the Council 
of Europes Staff Regulations.  Registry, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS, http://www.echr.coe.i
nt/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/How+the+Court+works/The+Registry/.
182. RULES OF THE COURT, supra note 138 (The oath/solemn declaration of the 
Members of the Registry is the following: I solemnly declare (I swear) that I will 
exercise loyally, discreetly and conscientiously the functions conferred upon me as 
an official of the Registry of the European Court of Human Rights.  Pursuant to 
Article 25 of Staff Regulations of the Council of Europe all other employees of the 
Council of Europe make the following solemn declaration: I solemnly declare that 
I will carry out the duties entrusted to me as a member of the staff of the Council of 
Europe loyally and conscientiously, respecting the confidence placed in me.  In 
discharging these duties and in my official conduct I will have regard exclusively to 
the interests of the Council of Europe.  I will not seek or receive any instructions in 
connection with the exercise of my functions from any government, authority, 
organisation or person outside the Council.  I will refrain from any action which 
might reflect upon my position as a member of the staff of the Council or which 
might be prejudicial morally or materially to the Council.).
183. Mahoney, supra note 19, at 347.
184. Id.
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connected to the issue of which body the staff members should 
answer to.  As Paul Mahoney puts it [i]t is surely indisputable that 
the staff of the Registry should be answerable only to the Court and 
not to the Secretary General or, ultimately through the Secretary 
General, to the Committee of Ministers, both of which are political 
entities.185 Paul Mahoney articulated this argument in 2003.  In 
2011 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted 
Resolution CM/Res(2011)9 which has amended the Staff 
Regulations of the Council of Europe, and certain staff management 
powers were transferred from the Secretary General to the Registrar 
of the Court.  These powers include authority to make appointments 
and promotions,186 powers related to authorising secondary 
activities, accepting gifts and other advantages,187 and even 
imposing disciplinary measures.188 Having said that, the staff
members of the Registry are still ultimately answerable to the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe since the above 
mentioned Resolution has not amended Article 2 of the Staff 
Regulations, which provide that staff members of the Council 
answer to, and are under the authority of the Secretary General.189
Some improvements have been made in the status of the employees 
of the ECtHR but this process should be continued.
3. Election of the Registrar and Deputy Registrar(s) of the 
Court.  One of the important safeguards of the independence of the 
ECtHR is the competence of the Court to elect its Registrar and 
Deputy Registrar(s).  This authority is laid down in the Rules of 
Court which provide that the plenary Court shall elect its Registrar 
and Deputy Registrar(s).190 However, according to Article 26 of the 
185. Mahoney, supra note 111, at 158.
186. COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, RESOLUTION AMENDING THE STAFF REGULATIONS 
WITH REGARD TO DELEGATION OF STAFF MANAGEMENT POWERS TO THE REGISTRAR OF 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 2 (2011), https://wcd.coe.int/
ViewDoc.jsp?id=1848861&Site=CM.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, STAFF REGULATIONS, art. 2 (1981) (Staff members of the 
Council shall be under the authority of the Secretary General and answerable to 
him or her. Hierarchical superiors in the Secretariat shall exercise their authority in 
the name of the Secretary General.), 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=COMP/
CM/Res(2007)1&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=part1&Site=COE&BackColorInternet
=99CCFF&BackColorIntranet=99CCFF&BackColorLogged=99CCCC.
190. Rules of Court, supra note 138, Rule 15(1).
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regulations on appointments in the Council of Europe the Registrar 
of the ECtHR shall be elected by the Plenary Court after the 
President has obtained the opinion of the Secretary General.  The 
Rules of Court do not require the Court to obtain the Secretary 
Generals opinion on this matter.  In 2007 the Registrar of the Court, 
Erik Fribergh, drew attention to this legal mismatch and urged the 
Council of Europe to amend the regulations.191 However, the 
difference between the Rules of Court, which reflect the real practice 
of the election procedure,192 and the Council of Europe Regulations 
on appointment has not been rectified.
This short study does not aim to exhaust all possible points of 
disagreement between the Secretary General and the ECtHR in the 
area of human resources.  Its main purpose is to show these issues 
exist, and that clear regulations which reflect the Courts special 
status as an independent tribunal should be adopted by the Council 
of Europe.  Even in areas where improvements have been made, 
points of contention remain.  
Another crucial aspect necessary to ensure the survival of an 
independent court is to provide an adequate budget.  The Courts 
website gives the following information on the budget of the 
ECtHR:
According to Article 50 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights the expenditure on the European Court of Human Rights is 
to be borne by the Council of Europe.  Under present 
arrangements the Court does not have a separate budget, but its 
budget is part of the general budget of the Council of Europe.  As 
such it is subject to the approval of the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe in the course of their examination of the 
overall Council of Europe budget.193
Mahoney points out that while the pre-1998 Court did not 
question the budgetary competence of the Committee of Ministers it 
prevented the Court from for example, deciding on the creation or 
191. Fribergh, supra note 172, at 155.
192. Id.
193. Budget, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., (Mar. 20, 2014) (The Courts budget for 2014 
amounts to 67,650,400 euros. This covers Judges remuneration, staff salaries and 
operational expenditure . . . It does not include expenditure on the building and 
infrastructure . . . .)
http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/howitwo
rks&c=#newComponent_1346157778000_pointer.
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upgrading of posts . . . .194 One option to promote judicial 
independence from the political institutions of the Council would be 
to provide the Court the power to maintain a completely 
independent budget from the Council of Europe. This solution is 
superficially appealing, but is sub-optimal as it risks the possibility 
of external influence by the Contracting Parties by threatening the 
independent budget of the Court without thereby calling into 
question the budget of the Council of Europe.  That is, an 
independent Court budget which is dependent on Member States 
contributions provides a potential means by which Member States 
can register their displeasure with a decision of the court.  
Furthermore, conflicts over budgeting could lead to unseemly 
disputes between the Court and Member States.  This paper argues
the Court should have a ring-fenced, or guaranteed, portion of the 
overall budget of the Council of Europe.  Elisabeth Lambert-
Abdelgawad points out that [i]t would . . . be desirable for the 
ECtHR to co-decide on its own budget or, at least, to have the 
competence to propose it; the lack of financial autonomy is 
dangerous and could jeopardise the capacity of the Court to perform 
its functions in the future.195 Therefore, certain autonomy is 
necessary within the Council of Europe budget.
The importance of the Registry to the institutional competence of 
the Court should not be underestimated.  Therefore, any 
consideration of the institutional independence of the Court must also 
incorporate a consideration of the role of the Registry.  This section 
has addressed the use of seconded lawyers by the Registry, the tenure 
and financial provisions relating to the Registry, and considered the 
position of the Registry in relation to the wider Council of Europe 
system.
V. Conclusion
Independence begets legitimacy begets effectiveness.  While 
some scholars believe independence should be subordinated to the 
interests of Contracting Parties, we argue that the independence of 
international human rights tribunals is a key component in ensuring 
194. Mahoney, supra note 111, at 159.
195. Elisabeth Lambert-Abdelgawad, The Court as a part of the Council of Europe: 
the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers, in CONSTITUTING EUROPE:
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL 
CONTEXT 263, 292-293 (Andreas Follesdal et al. eds. 2013).
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their legitimacy.
The protection of judicial independence in the ECtHR has 
typically focused on a corollary to the formal requirements of the 
rule of lawfixity of tenure, and the guarantee of salary.  More 
recently, however, there has been a burgeoning recognition that 
such formal indicia fail to recognise both the ancillary 
considerations related to judicial office, and the fact that threats to 
the independence of the court can both pre- and post-date the 
judicial term of office.  This article has argued that the abandonment 
of the system of national representation removes an unfavourable 
incentive for Member States to elect partisan nominees and also 
eliminates the challenges of the ad hoc judge procedure.  Moreover, 
an appropriate system of judicial election should be predicated on 
the fundamental norm of transparency. 
Judicial tenure itself is threatened by the limited term of office 
and the implications for judges once that term has ended.  This is an 
invidious form of pressure, which necessitates a concerted response 
by the institutions of the Council of Europe.  A judge who is 
uncertain of their future once they leave the bench cannot be fully 
independent.  A system which provides either for life tenure, or 
where judges can rely on a guarantee of judicial appointment in the 
national system would remove this uncertainty.  Furthermore, the 
return of judges to the national system provides an important 
normative role in that system whereby the returning judges help 
embed the ECHR in the domestic legal system of that country.
Finally, this article considered the position of the Registry in the 
ECtHR.  The importance of the Registry is difficult to overstate.  
Independence under the Convention is rooted in the independence 
of the Registry.  This independence is threatened by the recent 
increase in the appointment of B-lawyers and seconded lawyers.  
Moreover, the Registry should preserve a measure of autonomy 
from the political branches of the ECHR.
The judicial independence of the ECtHR is in purgatory.  It is 
insufficiently protected against the winds that buffet it, yet it retains 
sufficient formal protection to provide the chimera of stabile 
independence.  Reform of the institutions of the ECtHR is necessary 
to ensure such winds do not threaten the cornerstone of the ECHR 
system itself.
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